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Encouraging reports of dramatic reforms in Myanmar since late
2011 hide an ugly past. Until the recent developments, numerous
allegations of government-perpetrated war crimes and crimes
against humanity had evoked growing support for a U.N.-led
commission of inquiry and a potential referral of Myanmar to the
International Criminal Court. Perhaps the largest perceived
obstacle to invoking these international justice mechanisms was the
anticipated opposition of China, a veto-wielding member of the
U.N. Security Council and longstanding ally of Myanmar. This
article argues that, to the contrary, there is strong evidence that
China would not block international efforts to prosecute Myanmar
perpetrators of grave crimes. The combination of three factors in
particular support this proposition: first, China’s voting record on
the U.N. Security Council reflects a strong reluctance to use its veto
power; second, economic growth, political stability, and
international prestige—instead of the defense of other countries’
sovereignty—have become paramount to China’s foreign policy;
and third, in 2004 and 2005, China declined to veto a Commission
of Inquiry and referral to the ICC of Sudan, another important ally.
The article suggests that China would also be unlikely to exercise its
veto power in connection with Myanmar because the economic and
political costs of permitting a Commission of Inquiry and referral to
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the ICC of Myanmar are no greater than those that were associated
with Sudan. While recognizing that economic and political costs
are not the only factors that influence China’s decisions on the U.N.
Security Council, and that the political environments and nature of
crimes in Sudan and Myanmar are different, the article’s
comparative analysis seeks to demonstrate how “no” votes on
investigating and prosecuting crimes in Myanmar would
nevertheless be out of character for China.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since late 2011, there have been reports of “almost unimaginable
change” to the political environment in Myanmar.1 Censorship has been
relaxed, a number of political prisoners have been released, exiles have
been invited to return, and a law permitting independent trade unions has
been adopted.2 These changes have captured recent headlines, at least
momentarily obscuring the government atrocities that have been reported
over the past several decades. Yet reports from Myanmar indicate that
governmental violations of human rights continue,3 some still rising to the
level of international crimes.4
1

Amy Kazmin, Burma: At Freedom’s Gate, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5576df62-fb37-11e0-8df600144feab49a.html#axzz1c8GcN6rG.
See also Grant Peck, Myanmar Change Is
‘Dramatic,’ Senior U.S. Diplomat Says, JOURNALGAZETTE.NET, Oct. 10, 2011,
http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20111010/NEWS0402/111019972/1179. Burma was
renamed Myanmar in 1989 by its military leaders. Political opponents and some
governments, including the United States, have not accepted the change. Here the names
are used without political connotation. To avoid confusion, in this article “Myanmar” is
used as the name of the country. “Burmese” is used for the country’s citizens, for its
language, and as an adjective. “Burman” is used for the majority ethnic group.
2
Kazmin, supra note 1. Some skeptically view these changes as a mere ploy to warm
international relations. See, e.g., Camilla Buzzi, Norwegian Naïveté in Burma?, THE
IRRAWADDY,
Oct.
17,
2011,
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=22269&page=1; Daniel Schearf, Burma
Announces Mass Prisoner Release Amid Skepticism, Caution, VOICE OF AM., Oct. 10,
2011, http://www.voatibetanenglish.com/content/article--burma-announces-mass-prisonerrelease-amid-skepticism-caution-131512053/1266592.html; see also Myanmar Changes
Confuse
Observers,
CHINA
POST,
Sept.
23,
2011,
available
at
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/special-to-the-chinapost/2011/09/23/317553/Myanmar-changes.htm.
3
See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BITTER WOUNDS AND LOST DREAMS: HUMAN
RIGHTS UNDER ASSAULT IN KAREN STATE, BURMA (2012), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/burma-karen-rpt-ltr-2012.pdf
(documenting
recent human rights abuses in Karen State); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ‘THE GOVERNMENT
COULD HAVE STOPPED THIS’: SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND ENSUING ABUSES IN BURMA’S
ARAKAN
STATE
(2012),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover.pdf
(reporting
military abuses during sectarian violence in Rakhine—or Arakan—State).
4
See, e.g., Trent Franks, Franks: Obama Must Use Burma Visit to Push for Reform:
Atrocities Still Occurring Under Vicious Army, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/19/obama-must-use-burma-visit-topush-for-reform (noting that “atrocities committed against the Kachin by the Burma Army
may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity”); Human Rights Watch, ‘Untold
Miseries’: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State, 2012,
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0312ForUpload_1_0.pdf
(suggesting that the Burmese Army’s abuses in Kachin State may be war crimes);
ALTSEAN–BURMA, THE WAR IN KACHIN STATE: A YEAR OF MORE DISPLACEMENT AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS
ABUSES
(2012),
available
at
http://www.altsean.org/Docs/PDF%20Format/Thematic%20Briefers/The%20war%20in%2
0Kachin%20State%20-
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Before the recent reforms, influential organizations and powerful
governments were beginning to form a consensus that an international
commission of inquiry was needed to investigate crimes in Myanmar. In
late 2011, the highly regarded international human rights organizations
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International continued to insist that
the Myanmar government be held accountable at the international level for
its crimes.5 In May and September 2011, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, reported
%20A%20year%20of%20more%20displacement%20and%20human%20rights%20abuses.
pdf (arguing that Burmese army atrocities in Kachin State are war crimes and crimes
against humanity); KACHIN WOMEN’S ASS’N THAILAND, ONGOING IMPUNITY: CONTINUED
ARMY ATROCITIES AGAINST THE KACHIN PEOPLE (2012), available at
http://www.kachinwomen.com/images/stories/publication/ongoing_iimpunity%20.pdf
(noting that as of June 2012, little had changed since reports of war crimes and crimes
against humanity first emerged after the start of conflict in 2011). In late 2011, some even
noted an increase in government atrocities. See, e.g., UN General Assembly Fails to Act
on Crimes Against Humanity in Burma, BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, Nov. 4, 2011,
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/news-and-reports/news-stories/un-generalassembly-fails-to-act-on-crimes-against-humanity-in-burma (“[H]uman rights abuses
which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity have significantly increased
in the past year.”); US Urged on UN-Led Probe into Myanmar Atrocities, as Rapes
Escalate,
TAMIL
GUARDIAN,
Sept.
27,
2011,
http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3556 (reporting that military fighting
had actually increased since 2010).
5
Francis Wade, Burma Seeing ‘Rapid’ Reform: Think Tank, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF
BURMA,
Sept.
23,
2011,
http://www.dvb.no/news/burma-seeing%E2%80%98rapid%E2%80%99-reform-think-tank/17799 (noting that Human Rights
Watch questions whether the Myanmar National Human Rights Council could handle war
crimes enquiries, implying that international justice mechanisms must be triggered); see
also Benjamin Zawacki, The Good, Bad and Ugly in Myanmar, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Nov.
8, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MK08Ae01.html (arguing that
despite some positive political and economic changes, a Commission of Inquiry is still
needed in Myanmar). In March 2011, Human Rights Watch called for an international
commission of inquiry regardless of government reforms due to the duration and severity
of the alleged atrocities and in its World Report 2012 appeared to express frustration that
no country had taken leadership at the U.N. to make the commission of inquiry a reality.
See Human Rights Watch, Burma: Q&A on an International Commission of Inquiry, Mar.
24, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/24/burma-q-international-commission-inquiry
(“Even if [the Burmese government] was undertaking reforms, a CoI would be necessary
given the length and scale of serious abuses.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT
2012:
EVENTS
OF
2011
(2012),
at
300,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2012.pdf (“Despite support from 16
countries for a proposed United Nations commission of inquiry on serious violations of
international humanitarian law by all parties to Burma’s internal armed conflicts, no
country took leadership at the UN to make it a reality. Foreign government officials
expressed their optimism about government reforms despite abundant evidence of
continuing systematic repression.”). Even in late 2012, Human Rights Watch has reported
that the Myanmar’s army is “just as abusive as it was two years ago.” See David Scott
Mathieson, A Bridge Too Far for Obama, Crossed Too Early, in Myanmar, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 18, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/18/bridge-too-farobama-crossed-too-early-myanmar.
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continued widespread violence and abuse, reiterating his call for a U.N.
Commission of Inquiry to investigate state crimes. 6 Supporters also
included Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a previous U.N. Human Rights Special
Rapporteur for Myanmar,7 and the governments of the United Kingdom,8
Australia, 9 the United States, 10 France, 11 Slovakia, 12 Canada, 13 New
Zealand,14 Hungary,15 the Netherlands,16 Ireland,17 Lithuania,18 the Czech
6

Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/66/365 (Sept. 16, 2011); Myanmar: Situation of Ethnic
Minority Groups Restricts Transition to Democracy—UN Special Rapporteur, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, May 23, 2011,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11048&LangID
=E.
7
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, End Burma’s System of Impunity, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/opinion/28iht-edpineiro.html?_r=2.
8
Simon Tisdall, UK Backs Move to Refer Burma’s Leaders to War Crimes Tribunal, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/25/uk-backs-caseagainst-burma.
9
Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Considers Human Rights Situations in
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
Mar.
15,
2010,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9909&LangID=
E.
10
Kelley Currie, Commissioning Justice for Burma, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB30001424052748703846604575448423918526854.html.
11
Thomas Muang Shwe, France Joins Calls for UN Inquiry into Burma Abuses, MIZZIMA,
Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4391-france-joins-calls-for-uninquiry-into-burma-abuses.html.
12
Commission of Inquiry Inches Closer to Realization, MIZZIMA, June 10, 2010,
http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4019-commission-of-inquiry-inches-closer-torealization-.html.
13
Lee Berthiaume, Canada Throws Support Behind Burma Inquiry, EMBASSY, Sept. 8,
2010, http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/burma-09-08-2010.
14
Burma Campaign New Zealand, Burma Campaign New Zealand Welcomes the New
Zealand Government’s Endorsement of a Commission of Inquiry on Burma, BURMA
PARTNERSHIP, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.burmapartnership.org/2010/09/burma-campaignnew-zealand-welcomes-the-new-zealand-governments-endorsement-of-a-commission-ofinquiry-on-burma.
15
European MPs Welcome Hungary Support for Burma Crimes Inquiry, BURMA
CAMPAIGN UK, Sept. 6, 2010, http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/news-andreports/news-stories/european-mps-welcome-hungary-support-for-burma-crimesinquiry/142.
16
Netherlands Supports UN Burma Crimes Inquiry, BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, Sept. 21,
2010,
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/news-and-reports/newsstories/netherlands-supports-un-burma-crimes-inquiry/142.
17
Thomas Maung Shwe, Ireland Weighs in on UN Inquiry into Burma Abuses, MIZZIMA,
Sept. 25, 2010, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4405-ireland-weighs-in-on-uninquiry-into-burma-abuses.html.
18
Thea Forbes, Lithuania Joins Chorus Seeking UN Inquiry on Burma Abuses, MIZZIMA,
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4412-lithuania-joins-chorus-seekingun-inquiry-on-burma-abuses.html.
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Republic, 19 Denmark, 20 Belgium, 21 Estonia, 22 and Latvia. 23 In-depth
reports by the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School,
Physicians for Human Rights, and Amnesty International, and a joint
study by the International Federation for Human Rights, ALTSEANBurma,24 and the Burma Lawyers’ Council, all concluded that evidence of
grave crimes in Myanmar warrants criminal accountability measures at the
international level.25 The Burmese democracy leader, Nobel Peace Prize
winner, and current member of Myanmar’s Parliament, Aung San Suu Kyi,
also expressed support for a Commission of Inquiry on government
crimes.26
The recent political developments in Myanmar, however, have led
some to soften their stance. In March 2012, Special Rapporteur Quintana
emphasized that primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting
serious violations of international humanitarian law and international
human rights law belongs to the Myanmar government, and that “the
international commission of inquiry is only one option for ensuring that
justice is dispensed, accountability is established and impunity is

19

Simon Roughneen, Czech Supports UN War Crimes Inquiry on Burma, THE
IRRAWADDY, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18242.
20
Thomas Maung Shwe, Denmark, Latvia Support UN Commission of Inquiry, MIZZIMA,
Mar. 11, 2011, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4998-denmark-latvia-support-uncommission-of-inquiry.html.
21
Thomas Maung Shwe, Belgium Supports Burma UN Commission of Inquiry, MIZZIMA,
Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4844-belgium-supports-burma-uncommission-of-inquiry.html.
22
European Parliamentary Caucus on Burma, European MPs Welcome Estonia Support for
Burma
Crimes
Inquiry,
BURMA
PARTNERSHIP,
Oct.
8,
2010,
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2010/10/european-mps-welcome-estonia-support-forburma-crimes-inquiry.
23
Thomas Maung Shwe, supra note 20.
24
The Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) is “a network of
organizations and individuals based in ASEAN member states working to support the
movement for human rights and democracy in Burma.” About Us, ALTSEAN-BURMA,
http://www.altsean.org/Aboutus.htm (last visited July 23, 2012).
25
AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN EASTERN MYANMAR 47–49, 55 (2008),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/011/2008/en/72d2e8c2-b9ce4afb-91c6-ba3391ed41e5/asa160112008en.pdf; INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL.,
BURMA/MYANMAR: INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COMMITTED IN BURMA: THE URGENT NEED
FOR
A
COMMISSION
OF
INQUIRY
25–27
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/bu08.pdf; INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW
SCH.,
CRIMES
IN
BURMA
91–92
(2009),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Crimes-in-Burma.pdf; PHYSICIANS
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIFE UNDER THE JUNTA: EVIDENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
BURMA’S
CHIN
STATE
59
(2011),
available
at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/life-under-the-junta-burma-chin-state.pdf.
26
Ko Htwe & Lalit K. Jha, Suu Kyi Urges US Support for CoI, THE IRRAWADDY, June 23,
2011, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21551.
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averted.” 27 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Amnesty
International agreed, suggesting that a domestic judicial process could be
appropriate.28 Whether other supporters similarly have a change of heart
remains to be seen.
Under normal circumstances, commencing a criminal case does
not require the support of powerful countries, U.N. officials, or human
rights groups.29 Instead, allegations are simply brought to a prosecutor
who determines whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed. At the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), for instance, the Prosecutor
typically will begin an investigation based on the request of a country that
is a member of the ICC, 30 or based on information received from

27

Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/67 (Mar. 7, 2012).
28
Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Dec. 2, 2011, available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178103.htm (quoting Secretary Clinton as
saying, “[w]ith regard to the Commission of Inquiry, we always and consistently support
accountability for human rights violations, and we are looking for ways to support the
changes that are underway [sic] here because we hope that there will be an internal
mechanism accountability”); AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR: REVISITING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
MYANMAR, May 25, 2012, at 5, available at http://www.amnesty.org/zhhant/library/asset/ASA16/003/2012/en/62cc4319-a779-4c9e-93c80a3945203411/asa160032012en.pdf (“So long as its independence and impartiality are
assured, a domestic process could be as appropriate as an international mechanism,
including a UN-established Commission of Inquiry, for which Amnesty International
advocated exclusively in 2010 and 2011.” (emphasis in original)).
29
Forming a Commission of Inquiry is not the equivalent of opening a case at the
International Criminal Court (the “ICC”), but it is widely acknowledged as the first
investigative step towards a legal case. An ICC referral is not the only course of action
that the United Nations could take. In the past, the U.N. Security Council has established
ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, after investigations by Commissions of
Experts. See generally Tribunals and Other Mechanisms, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW,
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=18 (describing the varied judicial and quasijudicial “processes and mechanisms” employed at the United Nations, and listing some of
the hybrid tribunals and investigatory commissions that have been established to date);
About
the
Court,
INT’L
CRIMINAL
COURT,
http://www2.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (detailing in brief the creation of the ICC, after “[a]
general agreement [was reached] that an independent, permanent criminal court was
needed” to address international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and the crime of aggression).
30
Situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and the Central African
Republic have all been referred by countries that are “States Parties,” i.e., members of the
ICC.
See
All
Situations,
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www2.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations (listing all situations which have
currently been referred to the ICC and providing information on the referring parties); Mali
Crisis: ICC Launches Inquiry into ‘Atrocities’, BBC NEWS, July 18, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18893233 (reporting the request by the Malian
government to investigate atrocities allegedly committed in rebel-held areas).
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individuals or organizations.31 No U.N. involvement or stamp of approval
is necessary.
Myanmar, however, is not a typical case because it has not ratified
the Rome Statute, the founding statute of the ICC. Thus, the ICC has no
jurisdiction in Myanmar. Importantly, however, the drafters of the Rome
Statute made one crucial exception to the ICC’s lack of jurisdiction over
non-signatories: the U.N. Security Council, acting pursuant to its Chapter
VII powers relating to international peace and security, can “refer”
situations in non-signatory countries, like Myanmar, to the ICC.32 While
this exception provides a loophole for those seeking justice in Myanmar, it
also politicizes the case. Before anyone can even imagine Myanmar’s
notorious former ruler, Senior General Than Shwe, on trial at the ICC, the
U.N. Security Council must first be convinced to exercise its referral
power.33 This is an enormous political hurdle that most observers believe
is too high.34 Each of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and
France) has the power to veto non-procedural matters, such as an ICC
referral. The consensus is that China and Russia would almost certainly
block such a referral. 35 In fact, both China and Russia have spoken
31

This is called an investigation motu proprio (of one’s own motion or accord).
Investigations of situations in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire began as investigations motu
proprio. See, e.g., Manuel Ventura, Proprio Motu Investigation by the ICC Prosecutor:
Under What Circumstances Can the Prosecutor Initiate Investigations Proprio Motu?,
PEACE & JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementationresources/proprio-motu-investigation-by-the-icc-prosecutor.
32
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b), opened for signature July
17,
1998,
2187
U.N.T.S.
90,
available
at
http://www2.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE79CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf. Thus far, only the situations in Sudan and
Libya have been referred by the U.N. Security Council to the ICC.
33
While a variety of U.N. actors can initiate commissions of inquiry, such as the U.N.
Secretary-General, the U.N. Human Rights Council, the U.N. General Assembly, and the
U.N. Security Council, only the Security Council has the power to refer to the ICC the case
of a non-signatory country. See Agence France-Presse & Democratic Voice of Burma, US
Backs UN Inquiry in Burma, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Aug. 18, 2010,
http://www.dvb.no/news/us-backs-un-inquiry-in-burma/11323; Mark L. Goldberg,
Commissions of Inquiry, the Human Rights Council and the ICC, U.N. DISPATCH, Aug. 18,
2010, http://www.undispatch.com/commissions-of-inquiry-the-human-rights-council-andthe-icc; Amnesty International Public Statement: Myanmar: UN General Assembly Should
Call for Commission of Inquiry,
AMNESTY INT’L (Sept.
3,
2010),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/011/2010/en/f47ea10e-e9fe-460d-996cbd476d242173/asa160112010en.html.
34
This comment is based on the author’s conversations and attendance in meetings with
colleagues and NGO employees working on Myanmar issues.
35
See, e.g., Tisdall, supra note 8 (reporting that, according to Britain’s Ambassador to the
United Nations Sir Mark Lyall Grant, the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members
were “not sufficiently unanimous” on the question of referral). For views that China or
Russia would veto a referral, see, for example, Mark L. Goldberg, Momentum for Burma
Commission of Inquiry Seeming to Falter, U.N. DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 2010,
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directly on the issue, strongly denouncing all efforts to commence a U.N.
Commission of Inquiry in Myanmar.36
This article concludes that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
China may not be such a sure “no” vote. In 2005, observers similarly
claimed that China would not permit a U.N. Security Council referral of
the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC.37 Like Myanmar, Sudan had
not ratified the ICC’s Rome Statute.38 Yet in 2005, in a historic moment
for the ICC, the U.N. Security Council made its first referral to the
Prosecutor of the ICC.39 Eleven members voted in favor, including Russia,
none against, and Algeria, the United States, Brazil, and China
abstained.40 The referral’s approval was a “shock” to the international

http://www.undispatch.com/momentum-for-burma-commission-of-inquiry-seeming-tofalter; Kevin J. Heller, UK: Send Burma to the ICC, OPINIO JURIS, Mar. 26, 2010,
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/03/26/uk-send-burma-to-the-icc;
David
S.
Mathieson,
Commission of Inquiry for Burma is Long Overdue, THE BANGKOK POST, Mar. 28, 2010;
John Pomfret, U.S. Supports Creation of UN Commission of Inquiry into War Crimes in
Burma, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/17/AR2010081706026.html; Simon Roughneen, Quintana
Recommends UN War Crimes Commission on Burma, THE IRRAWADDY, Mar. 11, 2010,
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18013; Benjamin Zawacki, Amnesty Int’l
Myanmar Researcher, Remarks at Royal Inst. of Int’l Affairs, Myanmar’s 2010 Elections:
A
Human
Rights
Perspective,
May
11,
2010,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/007/2010/en/38ec32d1-d538-45df-8359fd09cbe84373/asa160072010en.html.
36
Colum Lynch, China Campaigning Against International Probe of Possible War Crimes
in Burma, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/25/AR2010102503168.html.
37
See, e.g., Robert Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593 and International Criminal Justice, 19
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 195, 203–04 (2006); Jack Goldsmith, Support War Crimes Trials for
Darfur, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2005, at A5; Renee Dopplick, UN Acts on Sudan but Ignores
Darfur,
INSIDE
JUSTICE,
Mar.
24,
2005,
http://cyberwonders.com/law/index.php/intl/2005/03/24/icc; Eric Reeves, ‘At this Moment,
Terrible Things Are Happening Today in Darfur, Sudan’－Kofi Annan, January 24, 2005,
to
the
UN
General
Assembly,
SUDANREEVES.ORG,
Jan.
27,
2005,
http://www.sudanreeves.org/2005/01/27/at-this-moment-terrible-things-are-happeningtoday-in-darfur-sudan---kofi-annan-january-24-2005-to-the-un-general-assembly-january24-2005/; Brian Smith, Conflict over Sudan on United Nations Security Council, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/feb2005/sudnf28.shtml; Adam Wolfe, Trying Times in Darfur and the Establishment of International
Criminal
Law,
GLOBAL
POL’Y
FORUM,
Mar.
4,
2005,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28502.html.
38
See Ayad Derbal, The ICC’s Involvement in the Situation in Darfur: Not a Threat to
Peace 2 (Univ. of Notre Dame Ctr. for Civil & Human Rights, Working Paper No. 1,
2008), available at http://www.nd.edu/~ndlaw/cchr/papers/ayad_The_ICC_and_Darfur.pdf
(noting that Sudan has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute).
39
Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of Int’l Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005).
40
Id.
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community. 41 In 2011, further demonstrating China’s willingness to
overlook the sovereignty concerns of an ally, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously referred the situation in Libya, another non-signatory, to the
ICC.42 No country abstained.
This article seeks to evaluate what China’s abstention on the
referral of Sudan may mean for the possibilities of a Commission of
Inquiry or of an eventual referral of Myanmar to the ICC.43 In particular,
this article examines the economic and political risks that China had to
accept in order to abstain on Sudan, and speculates as to how those risks
would compare if China abstained on Myanmar. 44 China’s evolving
foreign policy objectives, its voting history on the U.N. Security Council,
and its economic and political relationships with Sudan and Myanmar all
indicate that today, the opposite of 2005 is true: rather than an abstention
surprising anyone, it would be more surprising to see China veto a
Commission of Inquiry regarding or an ICC referral of Myanmar.
A preliminary word of caution: Sudan and Myanmar are vastly
different nations. They have different relationships with China. They are
viewed differently by the international community. Myanmar in 2012 is
not Sudan in 2005. Despite these differences, there is much to be learned
from China’s abstentions on Sudan and its relationships with Sudan and
Myanmar. Through an evaluation of these relationships and China’s
recent behavior on the U.N. Security Council, this article seeks to unearth
the fundamental considerations of China’s current foreign policy and
extrapolate how China would evaluate a vote relating to crimes in
Myanmar.
As background, Part II of this article describes China’s voting
history on the U.N. Security Council and its primary foreign policy
motives, revealing that China rarely uses its veto power and that it has
shifted away from protecting national sovereignty, tending to place more
value on international prestige.

41

Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice:
A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 185 n.22 (2006).
42
S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
43
While this article focuses on Sudan, China’s relationship with Libya could be viewed
similarly to support the inference of a potential Chinese abstention on Myanmar. See infra
Part IV (discussing briefly the Libya referral).
44
For an extensive analysis of China’s U.N. Security Council voting record, see Joel
Wuthnow, Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council
18–19 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University), available at
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A132019 (arguing that “China will be
more likely to cooperate with the U.S. [on Security Council action] when: (1) alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as UN mediation, have failed; (2) the U.S. has made
concessions or side-payments that limit the risks of agreement for China; (3) Washington
has applied high-level diplomatic pressure on Beijing; (4) Russia’s position has shifted
towards the U.S.; and (5) regional stakeholders have endorsed the U.S. position”).
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Part III traces the development of the U.N.’s Commission of
Inquiry regarding and its ICC referral of Sudan, focusing on China’s role,
Sudan’s reaction to China’s abstentions, and the tensions between the two
nations that the referral generated.
Part IV briefly discusses the referral of Libya to the ICC, and
China’s role in those deliberations.
Part V explains the basis for a Commission of Inquiry regarding
Myanmar and possible referral to the ICC, tracing the proposal from its
roots to the international stage.
Since continued domestic economic growth and political stability
are the primary drivers of China’s foreign policy, Parts VI and VII
examine China’s economic relationships with Sudan and Myanmar, while
Parts VIII and IX evaluate these nations’ political relationships. Part X,
the conclusion, sums up the analysis advanced in this article and briefly
notes possible accountability mechanisms other than the ICC.
The analysis reveals some startling facts. For instance, contrary to
what one might expect based on population and proximity, China is much
more economically dependent on Sudan than it is on Myanmar.
Furthermore, China depends on Sudan and Myanmar for less than one
percent of its overall trade, while for Sudan and Myanmar, China is
respectively one’s largest and the other’s second-largest trading partner.
These facts suggest the enormous disparity of economic power that China
wields over these two allies. The same is true for political leverage. As
rogue regimes facing constant pressure from the West, Sudan and
Myanmar need China’s political support much more than China needs
them. Perhaps most notably, diplomatic relations between China and
Sudan actually improved following the ICC referral, demonstrating
Sudan’s inability to retaliate against China for betrayal on the referral vote.
These observations by no means guarantee that China would vote to
approve a Commission of Inquiry on crimes in Myanmar or a referral of
Myanmar’s former leaders to the ICC, but they cast doubts on the
assumption that China would exercise its veto power to prevent such
actions.

II. MODERN MOTIVATIONS FOR CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY
A. China’s Voting History on the U.N. Security Council
An examination of China’s voting history on the U.N. Security
Council indicates that, perhaps surprisingly, China is one of the Council’s
most cooperative members. China has to a large extent adopted an
abstention strategy, by which it attempts to please both its allies and its
rivals. Since the creation of the Security Council in 1945, China has in
fact rarely voted “no.” From the P.R.C.’s ascension to the United Nations
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in November 1971 through October 2011, a period of 40 years, China
voted “no” only seven times.45 This is in comparison to 127 “no” votes by
the Soviet Union and Russia, 83 by the United States, 32 by the United
Kingdom, and 18 by France.46
China’s recent voting history illustrates that its reputation as a
principal adversary to Western objectives is misplaced. 47 Indeed, the
Security Council is more collegial than is often thought: from 1999 to
2009, 98% of all resolutions passed, and only 5% had any abstentions.48
China used three vetoes (one on Myanmar) and sixteen abstentions (five
on Sudan) during this period. 49 China was thus only the third-most
frequent veto user and the second-most frequent abstainer among the
Council’s permanent members.50 Out of the five permanent members,
during this period, China never used its veto power without an ally, and
was third most likely to be the lone abstention.51
In fact, since the Security Council began to meet in 1946, only
two of China’s “no” votes have been liberum vetoes that single-handedly
caused resolutions to fail. 52 Instead of using its veto power, China

45

See Report of the Open-Ended Working Grp. on the Question of Equitable
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Sec. Council and Other Matters
Related to the Sec. Council 13–17, U.N. Doc. A/58/47; GAOR, 58th Sess., Suppl. No. 47
(2004); Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, GLOBAL POL’Y
FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/32810.html
(last
visited July 23, 2012); United Nations Documentation: Research Guide, DEP’T OF PUB.
INFO., DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm (last
visited July 23, 2012). From 1946 to 1971, China’s vote in the United Nations was
controlled by the Republic of China, now based in Taiwan. The R.O.C. made one negative
vote during this period, blocking in 1955 Mongolia’s admission to the United Nations; this
stance was reversed in 1960 due to Soviet pressure. China and the United Nations—
Definition,
WORDIQ.COM,
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/China_and_the_United_Nations (last visited July 23,
2012). These statistics do not include negative votes on specific paragraphs.
46
Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, supra note 45; United
Nations Documentation: Research Guide, supra note 45. The vast majority of “no” votes
among all the permanent members were made before 1995. It should be noted that these
figures include “no” votes from the entire period of the U.N.’s existence, including the
years between 1946–71 before the P.R.C. joined. Id.
47
Katie Lynch, China and the Security Council: Congruence of the Voting Between
Permanent Members, 5 CHINA PAPERS 3 (2009) (“China is simply not the recalcitrant
antagonist on the Security Council that it is sometimes portrayed to be.”). But see Syria
Conflict: West ‘Appalled’ by Russia China UN Veto, BBC NEWS, July 19, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18914578 (reporting that China recently
joined Russia in three vetoes over the situation in Syria).
48
Id. at 2.
49
Id. at 3–4.
50
Id. at 3.
51
Id. at 9.
52
Yitzhak Shichor, China’s Voting Behavior in the UN Security Council, CHINA BRIEF,
Sept.
6,
2006,
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consistently abstains on matters that it considers to interfere in other
countries’ internal affairs or to undermine national sovereignty; before its
most recent veto on a resolution that would have threatened international
sanctions on Syria’s leadership, it had never affirmatively voted against
the imposition of sanctions or the use of force.53 This practice has been
explained as a way of keeping friends and avoiding making enemies:
“[i]n this way—typical of Beijing’s behavior in the UN as well as
reflecting its cultural legacies—the Chinese are able to send a message
and yet avoid the necessity of taking sides and alienating allies.”54 The
selectivity with which China uses its veto appears intended to maximize
its self-interest:
[A]bstention has become a kind of normative veto, an
expression of “principled opposition” without standing in
the way of the majority will. . . . The most obvious
explanation for such behavior is the desire to retain
maximum leverage as part of its indeterminate strategy of
becoming all things to all nations on many issues
intruding on the Security Council agenda.55
While China’s voting record does not tell us how it would vote on
a referral of Myanmar to the ICC, it clearly indicates that China is
reluctant to use its veto power and that it carefully weighs a number of
competing foreign policy interests when deciding how to vote. This
article will now turn to a discussion of those interests.
B. China’s Evolving Foreign Policy Concerns
China’s current foreign policy interests further support the notion
that China is far from an automatic “no” vote on a Commission of Inquiry
or a referral of Myanmar to the ICC. Today, China’s foreign policy
reflects its desires for political stability, economic prosperity, and
international prestige. Its modern-day decision-makers have become more
and more practical, and rather than taking entrenched ideological positions
have favored cooperation and compromise in order to fuel their nation’s
continued rise. Significantly, this pragmatic approach to foreign policy

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32007
&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1.
53
Id. Shichor’s article does not account for China’s 2007 “no” vote on the draft resolution
on the situation in Myanmar.
54
Id.
55
Samuel S. Kim, China and the United Nations, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS
AND PROSPECTS 42, 61–62 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999).
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has eroded China’s traditional position of defending sovereignty at all
costs.
China’s foreign policy decisions reflect both a grand strategy for
building the country’s wealth and power, and a domestic strategy for
maintaining the rule of the Communist Party.56 To that end, Chinese
leaders promote stable international and regional environments in which
their country’s economy can thrive and its position of power can
improve.57 As the Chinese people’s belief in Marxism has deteriorated,
China’s domestic strategy for Communist Party survival has focused on
rapid economic growth and a rise in living standards.58
To maintain international stability, China’s foreign policy
principles have increasingly reflected pragmatic concerns. China is now
“interested in maintaining normal relationships with as many countries as
possible, in order to maximize the substantial economic benefits it
receives from current levels of involvement in the world economy.”59 Its
policies vis-à-vis other countries now depend to a great extent on the
prospects for advantageous trade with them, with expectations for positive
economic outcomes reflected in cooperative diplomatic behavior. 60
Moving away from its past ideological concerns, China now adopts
international norms when they benefit the nation’s foreign policy goals,
but strongly rejects them when they interfere with China’s vital interests.61
While China’s rhetoric on international issues is often strong and
uncompromising, its actions, in contrast, are restrained and
accommodating.62
This shift away from ideology has made China’s position on state
sovereignty more flexible. During the 1980s, China’s position was that
sovereignty was a “sacred right.”63 Since the Tiananmen killings in 1989,
however, China has become increasingly cooperative when state
sovereignty is at issue, evidenced by a significant increase in its
56

PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS, INST. FOR NAT’L STRATEGIC STUD., CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM:
STRATEGY, DRIVERS, AND TOOLS 3 (2006).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 3–4.
59
Barry Naughton, The Foreign Policy Implications of China’s Economic Development
Strategy, in CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 47, 66 (Thomas W.
Robinson & David Shambaugh eds., 1994).
60
Rex Li, Security Challenge of an Ascendant China—Great Power Emergence and
International Stability, in CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM AND STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR 23, 24 (Suisheng Zhao ed., 2004).
61
Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, in
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, supra note 60, at 3, 4–
5.
62
Id. at 6.
63
Allen Carlson, More than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty
and Intervention Since Tiananmen, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN
POLICY 217, 221 (Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert S. Ross eds., 2006).

2012]

GAUGING COSTS TO CHINA OF ARTICLE 13(B) REFERRALS

347

involvement in international interventions.64 Influential Chinese foreign
policy elites and international relations experts helped to effect gradual
change, as they came to understand how participation in international
interventions could benefit China’s global image.65 China’s approaches to
sovereignty and intervention are widely misunderstood: although in its
words China proclaims its official support of sovereignty and nonintervention, in its actions it generally agrees to humanitarian
interventions in times of crisis, and has even begun to support such
missions actively.66 China’s support of the referral of Libya to the ICC is
concrete evidence of this trend.
China has also become more concerned with its image in recent
years.67 Chinese leaders are “eagerly seeking stature, acceptance, honor,
and respect everywhere on the world stage.”68 As China has become more
focused on global social recognition and on “externally based political
legitimacy,” its international cooperation has increased.69 In fact, since
the mid-1990s, international status has appeared to be the overriding
motivating factor in Chinese international relations—even more important
than power.70
In sum, Chinese foreign policy is more supportive of international
cooperation than is generally acknowledged. However, this increased
willingness to intervene in what are often arguably internal affairs should
not be overstated. China’s 2007 “no” vote to stop a Security Council
resolution pushing Myanmar towards democracy, primarily due to
concerns for state sovereignty, is a vivid reminder that respect for
64

Id. at 218. In 1990, for example, China supported the Security Council’s condemnation
of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and joined in the demand that Iraq withdraw. Id. at 221–22;
see also Chengqiu Wu, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Responsibility: Changes in
China’s Response to International Human Rights Crises, 15 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 71 (2010).
65
Carlson, supra note 63, at 218, 225–26.
66
Id. at 234. Research focusing on China’s position on intervention in conflict situations
indeed reveals that China evolved from principled opposition and non-participation in the
1970s, to support and non-participation in the 1980s, to support and participation in the
1990s. Jonathan Holslag, China’s Diplomatic Victory in Darfur, 2.4 BRUSSELS INST. OF
CONTEMPORARY
CHINA
STUD.
(BICCS)
ASIA
PAPERS
2
(2007),
http://www.oxfamsol.be/nl/IMG/pdf/Rap_China_Darfur.pdf.
This change has been
explained in a variety of ways, including China’s purported recognition that its interests
can be advanced through utilization of the Security Council, its realization that cooperation
is necessary to co-exist with the West, its economic and security interdependence and
maturation as a world power, and its socialization and learning after decades as a member
of the Security Council. Id.
67
Zhao, supra note 61, at 14.
68
Fei-Ling Wang, Beijing’s Incentive Structure: The Pursuit of Preservation, Prosperity
and Power, in CHINA RISING: POWER AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 19, 39
(Yong Deng & Fei-Ling Wang eds., 2005).
69
Yong Deng & Fei-Ling Wang, Introduction, in CHINA RISING, supra note 68, at 1, 11.
70
Yong Deng, Better than Power: ‘International Status’ in Chinese Foreign Policy, in
CHINA RISING: POWER AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 68, at 51–
52, 62.
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sovereignty remains a vital component in China’s foreign policy
considerations.71

III. THE REFERRAL OF SUDAN TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
The U.N. Security Council’s proposed referral in 2005 of the
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC was an important litmus test for
China. How would it balance, on one hand, its own economic interests in
Sudan and its longstanding view that internal matters are not appropriate
for U.N. Security Council action, and on the other hand its increased
interest in enhancing its international image and in cooperating in
international coalitions?
A. The Conflict in Darfur
The roots of the conflict that led to the crisis in Darfur date back
to at least 1955, when disagreements over unification of the southern
(predominantly Christian and Animist) and northern (predominantly Arab
and Muslim) parts of the country led to a mutiny by southern army units.72
In 1972, the two sides reached a cease-fire agreement that led to a ten-year
hiatus in the conflict. 73 However, the leader of Sudan, a born-again
Muslim who came to power in 1969 by military coup, steadily reduced the
South’s autonomy, as part of his goal of creating an Islamic state. 74
Hostilities resumed between the North and the South in 1983.75 In 1989,
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, a little-known brigadier in the Sudanese
Army, led a military coup that overthrew the government.76 In 1993, he
dissolved the ruling military junta and appointed himself president. 77
Fighting between North and South would last for twenty-two years and
take almost two million lives.78 In 2005, a peace agreement was finally

71

For a discussion of China’s vote, see infra Part IX.
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Id. at 142–43.
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(1995).
75
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(2006).
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DIANA CHILDRESS, OMAR AL-BASHIR’S SUDAN 9 (2010).
77
FACTBOX—Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, REUTERS, July 14, 2008,
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Peter Walker, Profile: Omar al-Bashir, THE GUARDIAN, July 14, 2008,
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signed between the Southern rebels and the Northern-oriented national
government.79
Since the 1980s, while the conflict between North and South
Sudan raged on, ethnic rebels in Darfur, a region of Western Sudan, had
also been fighting against Arab militias supported by the central Sudanese
government.80 Triggering the crisis that would make the Darfur situation
known worldwide, in 2003, rebels claiming economic marginalization
attacked government troops. 81 In response, the government-supported
Arab Janjaweed militia began ethnic cleansing of local tribes.82 Interrebel fighting, and the outbreak of hostilities in 2005 across Sudan’s
border with Chad, which borders Darfur to the west, compounded what
became a humanitarian crisis;83 indeed, the conflict in Darfur has been
described as “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.” 84
Refugees reported that government air raids preceded slaughtering, raping,
and pillaging carried out by the Janjaweed.85 On September 9, 2004, U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that genocide had been
committed in Darfur, based upon a consistent and widespread pattern of
atrocities that included killings, rapes, and the burning of villages.86
Powell’s statement coincided with U.S. efforts to establish a U.N.
Commission of Inquiry to determine whether the Sudanese government
79

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, INT’L CRISIS GROUP
(Afr. Report No. 106, Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/hornof-africa/sudan/106-sudans-comprehensive-peace-agreement-the-long-road-ahead.aspx.
80
Lipscomb, supra note 41, at 188.
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U.S. State Dep’t Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor & Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur, in 2 AN ORAL AND
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE DARFUR GENOCIDE 163, 168 (Samuel Totten ed., 2011).
82
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(Jul.
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2008,
10:22
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/2403635/Sudane
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D. Murphey, ‘Do Something About Darfur’: A Review of the Complexities, 33 J. SOC., POL.
& ECON. STUD. 229 (2008) (arguing that the Darfur conflict was caused by a complex set
of factors including demographics, geography, history, economics, and factionalism);
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NEWS,
Feb.
23,
2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3496731.stm (reporting that the government of
Sudan denies that it is allied with the Janjaweed).
83
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘They Came Here to Kill Us’: Militia Attacks and Ethnic
Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad, at 6, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 9, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/node/11075/section/1 (describing the deterioration in Sudan-Chad
relations after “Sudanese government officials suspicious of Chadian support to the Darfur
rebels began to provide material backing to [rebel movements in Chad,]” and the
humanitarian crises engendered by the conflict on both sides of the border).
84
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NEWS
CENTRE,
May
4,
2004,
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and militia were responsible for genocide. 87 At that time, Security
Council members Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom backed the
resolution, but China warned that it might veto it.88 Thus began Sudan’s
journey towards the ICC.
B. The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
On September 18, 2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1564, determining that the situation in Darfur was a threat to
international peace and security, and requesting that the Secretary-General
establish an international commission of inquiry for the purpose of
investigating reports of violations of humanitarian and human rights law
in Darfur. 89 No members voted against the Resolution; China, Russia,
Pakistan, and Algeria abstained.90 China’s abstention from Resolution
1564 and its comments thereon were consistent with the pattern described
supra in Part II of this article: with its words, China supported and
defended Sudan, but with its deeds, it declined to stop Security Council
action that adversely affected its ally. Behaving typically, China’s
Ambassador to the United Nations in his comments on Resolution 1564
dodged the Commission of Inquiry topic and instead complimented Sudan
and the African Union, calling on fellow countries to support diplomatic
efforts.91
Beginning its work on October 25, 2004, the Commission made
two evidence-gathering missions to Sudan, and visited refugees in
neighboring Chad, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. 92 Three months later, the
Commission issued its report, which concluded that the Janjaweed and the
Sudanese government had violated human rights and humanitarian laws.93
Their crimes included the burning of villages, the mass murder of civilians,
widespread and systematic rape, torture, forcible displacement, and
enforced disappearances; to the extent that these crimes were carried out
on a discriminatory basis and in a systematic and widespread manner, they
87

Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, WASH. POST,
Sept. 10, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html.
88
Id.
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to Obtain Sudan’s Full Compliance with Security, Disarmament Obligations on Darfur,
U.N. Press Release SC/8191 (Sept. 18, 2004).
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Id.
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Report of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Sec’y-Gen., U.N.
Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005); John L. Washburn & Wasana Punyasena, The Commission
of Inquiry on Darfur: A United Nations Success Story, 10 UNA-USA POLICY BRIEF 3
(2005).
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Report of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Sec’y-Gen.,
supra note 92, at ¶ 630.
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also constituted crimes against humanity.94 While the Commission did not
find evidence that the Sudanese government intended to commit genocide,
it nonetheless recognized that individual government officials might have
acted with genocidal intent.95 Concluding that many of the alleged crimes
“meet all the thresholds of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court,” the Commission strongly recommended that the Security Council
refer the situation to the ICC pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome
Statute.96
C. ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Countries
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, 97 the legal authority for
bringing the situation in Darfur before the ICC, has been the subject of
considerable controversy.98 In essence, it empowers the U.N. Security
Council to grant jurisdiction to the ICC over situations in any country,
even those countries that have not ratified the Statute.99 This Section (C)
introduces Article 13(b) and briefly addresses questions of its legitimacy.
As a general rule of international law, a country that does not
ratify a treaty is not bound by it.100 Neither rights nor obligations arise for
non-signatories.101 The Rome Statute, however, contemplates a deviation
from this axiom. In general, Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute102 provides
that either of two preconditions must exist for the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over a crime: (a) the crime must have been committed in the
territory of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute, or that has accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) the person accused of the crime must
be a national of such a state. In other words, the ICC cannot act in a
country, or against a citizen from a country, that has not either ratified the
Rome Statute or consented to the ICC’s jurisdiction. However, critically,
94

Id. at ¶¶ 631–38.
Id. at ¶¶ 640–41.
96
Id. at ¶ 647.
97
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 32, art. 13(b).
98
See Chris Gallavin, Prosecutorial Discretion Within the ICC: Under the Pressure of
Justice, 17 CRIM. L. F. 47 (2006) (noting that the relationship between the Security Council
and the ICC was one of the top three issues debated in 1988 during the Rome Conference
where the Rome Statute was adopted).
99
See BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 79 (2003) (noting that Security
Council referrals to the ICC were originally justified because they allowed the ICC to act
in lieu of ad hoc tribunals).
100
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (5th ed. 2003). An exception to the rule:
where a treaty codifies customary law, a non-signatory remains bound. Id. There is little
basis to argue, however, that the Rome Statute reflects customary law.
101
Monika Lueke & Chanaka Wikremasinghe, Analytical Report, in TREATY MAKING—
EXPRESSION OF CONSENT BY STATES TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY 1, 8 (Council of Europe
ed., 2001).
102
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 32, art. 12(2).
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these two Article 12(2) jurisdictional preconditions only apply to: (a)
situations referred to the ICC Prosecutor by a State Party, and (b)
situations in which the Prosecutor’s office has initiated investigations
itself. They do not apply to Article 13(b) situations, i.e., situations
referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter.103 Thus, when Articles 12(2) and 13(b) are read in
conjunction, it becomes clear that lying between these two subsections is a
loophole that permits jurisdiction over non-signatory nations, because the
preconditions of Article 12(2), which require ratification or consent, do
not apply to referrals by the U.N. Security Council to the ICC. This boils
down to the following: the ICC may prosecute nationals of states that are
not parties to the Rome Statute, such as Sudan and Myanmar, for crimes
committed in those countries, if and when the U.N. Security Council so
decides.104
The power of the U.N. Security Council to refer non-signatory
states under Article 13(b) has been hotly criticized as a violation of basic
principles of international law.105 Analysts have pointed out, however,
that these referrals can be viewed as reflections of the Security Council’s
powers under the U.N. Charter, to which all U.N. members are bound.106
103

Id. art. 13(b). Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council authority to
act in cases involving threats to international peace and security.
104
Cf. HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE TRIGGERING PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 92 (2005) (noting that as a precondition to referral, the Security Council must
determine that the situation poses a threat to international peace, is a breach of the peace,
or is an act of aggression); Philippe Kirsch et al., International Tribunals and Courts, in
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 281, 288 (David
Malone ed., 2004) (discussing important limitations on Article 13(b) referrals).
105
See, e.g., HANS KÖCHLER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS ADMINISTRATOR OF JUSTICE? 49–
55 (2011) (arguing that Article 13(b) referral power contradicts the norm of sovereign
equality, undermines the legitimacy of jurisdiction under the Rome Statute, and weakens
international criminal justice because of the political nature of referrals); John Laughland,
The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: ‘Ubi Lex Voluit, Dicit; Ubi Noluit, Tacit’, ICC
WATCH (Mar. 2009), http://www.iccwatch.org/article_Mar09.html (arguing that
jurisdiction over non-parties is not expressly granted in the Rome Statute, and that Article
13(b) should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to situations involving nationals of state
parties in the territories of state parties); ALEXANDER MEZYAEV, INST. OF DEMOCRACY &
COOPERATION, THE LEGALITY OF THE INDICTMENT OF PRESIDENT BASHIR: INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ICC PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER DECISION ON THE ARREST WARRANT
AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OF SUDAN, Apr. 6, 2009, http://www.idc-europe.org/en/Thelegality-of-the-ICC-indictment-of-President-Bashir (arguing that the Security Council can
only act pursuant to the U.N. Charter, which does not allow for referrals relating to nonsignatories); cf. Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another
Round?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 979 (2005) (discussing the interplay between the ICC and
sovereignty).
106
See, e.g., GIDEON COPPLE, THE AM. NON-GOV’TAL ORG. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM.
COURT, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE ICC DARFUR INVESTIGATION, June 6, 2007,
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Darfur%20Q&A.pdf; Vera Gowlland-Debas, The Relationship
Between the Security Council and ICC, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2001,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28588.html.
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Hence, under certain conditions, the ICC’s jurisdiction derives its
legitimacy not from treaty obligations but by virtue of Security Council
action. 107 One commentator has argued that because Sudan was
represented in the 2003 and 2004 meetings of the U.N. General Assembly,
when the relationship between the United Nations and the ICC was
established, implying the acceptance of Article 13(b) by the member states
of the United Nations, it cannot object to ICC and United Nations
coordination on referrals.108 From a practical perspective, the argument
against ICC jurisdiction over non-states parties referred by the U.N.
Security Council is now of merely academic interest: the Security Council
has recognized that jurisdiction exists, making use of it in its Sudan and
Libya referrals, and the judges of the ICC have accepted review of the
Darfur situation, concluding that it falls within the jurisdiction of their
court.109
D. The Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC
Turning back to Darfur: on March 31, 2005, a little over three
months after the issuance of the Commission of Inquiry’s report, the U.N.
Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.110 Resolution
1593, introduced by Britain and Northern Ireland, was approved with
eleven votes in favor, none against, and abstentions by China, the United
States, Brazil, and Algeria.111
In China’s sixteen-sentence statement accompanying the vote,
only one sentence provided any support for the Resolution: “[L]ike other
107

Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its
Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunities, 7.2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333 (2009); Max du Plessis &
Christopher Gevers, Darfur Goes to the International Criminal Court (Perhaps), 14.2 AFR.
SEC. REV. 23 (2005), available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14No2/F2.pdf.
108
Innocent Mawire, Darfur and the International Criminal Court: Some Jurisdictional
Issues,
INT’L
LAW
OBSERVER,
Oct.
15,
2008,
http://internationallawobserver.eu/2008/10/15/darfur-and-the-international-criminal-courtsome-jurisdictional-issues.
109
ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Fifth Report of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 8–9 (June
7, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CE794D3B-ED91-4D86-A28E3F61E6C44083/277796/OTP_ReportUNSC5Darfur_English.pdf. The ICC would have
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Myanmar by a citizen of a signatory even without a
referral. For example, Htoo Htoo Han, now an Australian citizen, admitted to committing
war crimes as an officer in Myanmar’s military intelligence. However, his crimes were
committed prior to 2002, the effective date of the Rome Statute. See Mike Hedge,
Australian Admits War Crimes in Burma, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 18, 2011, ngnews-national/australian-admits-war-crimes-in-burma-20110718-1hkug.html (reporting on
executions of anti-government student leaders in which Htoo Htoo Han was involved
during Myanmar’s 1988 student uprising).
110
S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
111
U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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members of the international community, we deeply deplore the gross
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in
Darfur.”112 The remainder of the statement expressed support for attempts
to settle the situation in Darfur under the auspices of the African Union,
concern that efforts be made to ensure that the ICC case not negatively
impact movement towards peace, and a preference that any trial take place
within the Sudanese judicial system. 113
Noting China’s strong
disagreement over the referral, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya
added: “We cannot accept any exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction against
the will of non-State parties, and we would find it difficult to endorse any
Security Council authorization of such an exercise of jurisdiction by the
ICC.”114 So if China strongly opposed the referral, why did it abstain,
rather than exercise its veto? In fact, China had reportedly assured
Sudanese officials that it would not permit Resolution 1593 to pass.115
Answering the above question requires a great deal of speculation,
as, unfortunately, there are no statements from the Chinese government
that directly and candidly answer it.116Analysts seem to cluster around the
theory that international political pressure was too great for a veto.
Mayank Bubna speculates that the referral went through because the
Security Council was facing increasing political isolation and public
activism.117 Claudio Guler hypothesizes that “normative pressures” likely
convinced China to abstain.118 Josh Kurlantzick argues that China worries
little about freedom or human rights, but instead cares most about stability
for its economic interests, its reputation as a responsible actor on the world

112

Id. at 5.
See Derbal, supra note 38, at 5–11 (noting that Sudan’s domestic justice system appears
neither willing nor able to adequately prosecute the alleged crimes); Julie B. Martin, The
International Criminal Court: Defining Complementarity and Divining Implications for the
United States, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 107, 115 (2006) (observing that the ICC
Prosecutor determined that the Sudanese justice system was unwilling or unable to
genuinely prosecute the most egregious offenders in the Darfur conflict).
114
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158, supra note 111, at 5.
115
China Defends Decision Not to Veto Darfur ICC Referral, SUDAN TRIB., Nov. 11, 2009,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33085.
116
See id. (relating how, when asked directly as to why China declined to “give full
support to Africa” on the question of referral, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
sidestepped the ICC aspect of the question, instead addressing how China supported
increased African representation on the Security Council).
117
Mayank Bubna, The ICC’s Role in Sudan: Peace Versus Justice, EURASIA REV., Apr.
28,
2010,
http://www.eurasiareview.com/2010/04/iccs-role-in-sudan-peace-versusjustice.html.
118
Claudio Guler, Slow Dancing with Sudan, INT’L REL. & SEC. NETWORK, May 8, 2009,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=100004.
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stage, and to some extent the safety of its citizens abroad.119 Christine
Chaumeau asserts that the political cost of threatening a veto was too high
for China, given the grave nature of the alleged crimes. 120 Jonathan
Holslag writes that China believed that the ICC referral would not threaten
Sudanese officials because the court’s work would depend on cooperation
from the Sudanese government.121
The truth probably lies somewhere among all of these answers.
Surely China’s longstanding practice of trying to please all sides must
have played some role in its decision to abstain. Its newfound
preoccupation with international prestige was also likely a factor,
particularly after the United States began calling the situation “genocide.”
Probably, China attempted to weigh the cost of abstention against its
benefit. China probably determined, based on the foreign policy
motivations outlined in Part II, that the potential political and economic
detriment to its relationship with Sudan that would be caused by an
abstention was outweighed by the benefit of aligning with the
international community by implicitly supporting action against patent
atrocities.
E. Post-Referral Fallout
Sudan’s response to the referral tested whether China had
calculated its benefits and detriments correctly. The government of Sudan
was clearly angry over the referral and over China’s refusal to exercise its
veto power. 122 The National Islamic Front, the political organization
controlling the Sudanese government, immediately rejected Resolution
1593.123 President al-Bashir took an oath three times that he would never
hand anyone over to the Court.124 Some feared that foreigners would
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ONLINE,
May
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available
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http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18329.
120
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INVESTING IN TRAGEDY: CHINA’S MONEY, ARMS, AND POLITICS IN
SUDAN 18, n. 177 (2008) (explaining China’s failure to veto resolution 1593 as a result of a
belief that ‘doing so would have carried too high a political cost, given the gravity of the
crimes in question,’ and citing Christine Chaumeau’s article, “Beijing’s Calculated
Prudence,” in the International Justice Tribune (Oct. 23, 2006)), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedyreport.pdf.
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Holslag, supra note 66, at 7.
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Chris Buckley, China Has ‘Grave Concerns’ over ICC Sudan Decision, REUTERS, July
15, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSPEK27439220080715?pageNumber=2.
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Eric Reeves, Darfur and the International Criminal Court, MIDDLE E. RESEARCH &
INFO. PROJECT, Apr. 29, 2005, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero042905.
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become targets of violence.125 Atrocities temporarily increased.126 Some
Westerners even criticized the referral as taking attention away from
humanitarian assistance.127
Something of a test of wills then began between the ICC and the
Sudanese government. First, the government of Sudan refused to allow
the ICC Prosecutor’s team to open an office in Sudan, instead establishing
its own Special Criminal Court for Events in Darfur.128 Then, in April
2007, after the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Sudan’s
former Minister of State for the Interior, who was responsible for
recruiting, funding, and arming the Janjaweed militia, and for a militia
leader who was allegedly involved in a string of massacres and other
violations, including widespread rape, the Sudanese government continued
to resist. It kept the Minister in his new position as Minister of State for
Humanitarian Affairs, and even appointed him to lead an inquiry into
allegations of human rights abuses in Darfur.129 A formal request by the
ICC to the Sudanese government to hand over the two men was met with
defiance.130
Predictably, China continued to publicly support Sudan, and
behind the scenes worked to protect its ally. After the ICC Prosecutor
delivered a report describing Sudan’s uncooperativeness, China, along
with Qatar, reportedly undermined the U.N. Security Council’s efforts to
issue a Presidential Statement in response.131 In July 2008, a British125

“Far from providing a deterrent effect, the ICC referral poses readily discernible
dangers to both civilians and humanitarian aid workers. How could it be otherwise when
those effectively indicted, and thus faced with extradition, still control Sudan? Who could
imagine that senior members of the NIF would ever subject themselves to the authority of
international justice? . . . . Knowledgeable Darfuris in exile and regional intelligence
sources speak urgently of the strong sense within the humanitarian aid community that, in
the event of an ICC referral, the [J]anjaweed will be encouraged by Khartoum to escalate
attacks on foreigners, especially aid workers. These concerns were partly confirmed in an
April 25 Washington Post dispatch from the Nyala region.” Id.
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Nick Grono & David Mozersky, Sudan and the ICC: A Question of Accountability,
INT’L CRISIS GRP., Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-ofafrica/sudan/op-eds/sudan-and-the-icc-a-question-of-accountability.aspx.
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See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 123 (“So exclusively was the focus on achieving an ICC
referral that the morally more immediate and compelling need for humanitarian
intervention and civilian protection received only an advocacy nod.”).
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Alex de Waal, Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation,
in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 29, 30 (Nicholas Waddell
& Phil Clark eds., 2008).
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Id.
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Id. at 31.
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China Shields Sudan in the Security Council After ICC Prosecutor’s Report, HUMAN
RIGHTS
FIRST,
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2007,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/darfur/2007/alert/181/index.htm. A Presidential
Statement is a statement issued by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the
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(Mar. 6, 2012) (condemning violence between Sudan and South Sudan, and urging both
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drafted Presidential Statement on Sudan was also withdrawn after Chinese
opposition.132
China continued voicing support for Sudan when the ICC
Prosecutor announced genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
charges against Sudanese President al-Bashir.133 During a trip to Sudan in
the fall of 2008, China’s special envoy and Assistant Foreign Minister
emphasized China’s “consistent position”: support of the resolution of the
Darfur issue through political means.134
The ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir in
March 2009 on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes
brought additional tension. Al-Bashir reportedly retorted that the ICC
could eat the warrant, and he danced in front of thousands of supporters
who burned an effigy of the ICC Chief Prosecutor. 135 Some were
concerned that the indictment would damage the peace process.136 China
opposed it, saying that it would not contribute to peace and stability,137
and China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed China’s “regret and
worries.”138
Although China faced a great deal of pressure to respond to
Sudan’s defiance, it continued to remain passive and non-committal. In
January 2010, China’s Ambassador to Sudan said that China would adopt
a “clear and suitable stance” if the ICC were to “issue a decision against
countries to reach a border demarcation agreement and to “implement and respect . . . their
10 February Memorandum of Understanding on Non-Aggression and Cooperation”),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10568.doc.htm. “The Presidency
of the Security Council is held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the
English alphabetical order of their names. Each President holds office for one calendar
month.” Members, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited
July 24, 2012).
132
TED DAGNE, SUDAN: THE CRISIS IN DARFUR AND THE STATUS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH
PEACE AGREEMENT 12 (2010).
133
Peter Walker & James Sturcke, Darfur Genocide Charges for Sudanese President Omar
al-Bashir,
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GUARDIAN,
July
14,
2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/14/sudan.warcrimes1.
134
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Visits Sudan Successfully, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
(Sept.
4,
2008),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xybfs/gjlb/2883/2885/t511195.htm.
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Warrant Issued for Sudan’s Leader, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7923102.stm.
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See, e.g., Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for
Sudan’s Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A6 (noting that United Nations diplomats,
the Arab League, the African Union, and some humanitarian organizations were concerned
that the arrest warrant would threaten peace talks).
137
China Opposes ICC Warrant for Sudan’s President, VOICE OF AM., Nov. 2, 2009,
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-03-05-voa9-68812787/412939.html.
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Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on March 5,
2009, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE U.K., Mar. 7, 2009,
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/fyrth/t540975.htm.
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Al-Bashir.”139 Commenting on the possible application of Article 16 of
the Rome Statute,140 which allows the U.N. Security Council to freeze ICC
action on referral cases for up to twelve months, the Ambassador was
reported as merely confirming “extensive consultations” and indicating
support for Sudanese sovereignty.141 China’s strategy of providing moral
support for Sudan during the ICC proceedings, while refraining from
using its considerable power to protect Sudan directly, reinforces the
notion that it seeks to be a friend to all:
China has distanced itself from the recent warrant debate
altogether, although it condemned al-Bashir’s original
arrest warrant when it was first issued. China is in a
difficult position regarding the ICC charges; while it
wants to portray itself as a “team player” and a benevolent
power, China has substantial oil assets in Sudan. Backing
out is China’s best course of action because it neither
condemns the ICC’s new warrant—an action that would
sour its relations with the West—nor does it demand alBashir’s arrest, which could hinder its oil supply from
Sudan.142
In April 2010, Sudan held its first open presidential election in
twenty-four years. The ICC remained a “looming shadow” over the
election.143 “To the Hague” was scribbled on six ballots in a small town in
western Sudan.144 On April 26, al-Bashir was announced the winner,
having received 68% of the vote.145 Although he had hoped the election
results would help him defy the ICC warrant, the election was tainted by
accusations of widespread fraud and other irregularities.146 In July 2010,
the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for al-Bashir, this time for
139
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genocide.147 African and Arab governments, as well as China, lobbied for
postponement of the indictment.148 On March 1, 2012, the ICC issued a
warrant for the arrest of Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, Sudan’s current
defense minister, who is accused of crimes against humanity and war
crimes.149
As of the end of 2012, all four Sudanese suspects remained at
large.150 Despite the ongoing nature of their cases, at this time it is clear
that, for the most part, China’s abstentions paid off. While the indictments
presumably caused acute diplomatic headaches for China, its primary
interests of increasing trade with Sudan, promoting political stability in the
region, and attaining prestige through international cooperation were all
satisfied. Today, China’s trade with Sudan continues to blossom;151 while
Sudan remains one of the world’s most challenging environments, it is
relatively stable;152 and China can legitimately claim that it did not prevent
the pursuit of justice in reaction to the situation in Darfur. If the ICC’s
involvement in Sudan had caused additional instability and damaged
China’s economy, the prospects for a Commission of Inquiry in Myanmar
would be less viable. The arguably benign impact (to China) of China’s
abstentions on Sudan, however, has helped pave the way for a U.N.
investigation into crimes in Myanmar and a possible referral to the ICC.
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future stability will depend largely on the abilities of North and South Sudan to manage
their separation, internal political turmoil in al-Bashir’s party, and the spillover effects of
recent protests and uprisings in the Middle East, Tunisia, and Egypt. Somewhat
surprisingly, they also comment that al-Bashir has been a “force for stability . . . albeit a
brutal, repressive stability” and that his departure “would unleash unpredictable forces.”
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because his position gives him added protection against arrest; ironically this may result in
additional stability for Sudan. See id.
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IV. THE REFERRAL OF LIBYA TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
On February 26, 2011, the U.N. Security Council referred Libya
to the ICC, its second Chapter VII referral.153 All of the members of the
Security Council, including China, approved.154 In a brief statement, the
Chinese representative noted the “special circumstances” in Libya, citing
bloodshed, violence, civilian casualties, and safety of foreign nationals in
Libya.155
As with Sudan, China’s responses to the situation in Libya were
characterized by vocal resistance to U.N. action mixed with tacit approval
at the time of voting. At the outset, China resisted U.N. Security Council
action in Libya, for example in blocking a no-fly zone over Libya.156
Although China did not use its veto to stop NATO bombing, it later
condemned the bombing.157 Reportedly, China was also the only country
to initially reject the idea of referring Libya to the ICC, although
apparently a letter from the Libyan ambassador condemning Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi persuaded it otherwise, leading to the unanimous
approval.158 As in the Darfur situation, China’s pattern of vocal resistance
153

S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 42; see also Louis Charbonneau, EU, U.S. to Urge U.N.
Sanctions
on
Syria,
ICC
Referral,
REUTERS,
Aug.
22,
2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/us-syria-un-sanctionsidUSTRE77L6MX20110822 (reporting that a referral of Syria, another non-signatory of
the Rome Statute, may soon be on the agenda of the Security Council).
154
S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 42. The ICC has issued warrants for the arrest of three
Libyan suspects. Libyan authorities arrested two of the suspects but have refused to
surrender them to ICC authorities. The warrant for the arrest of Muammar Gaddafi was
dropped following his death in 2011. Cases and Situations: Libya, COALITION FOR THE
INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=libya (describing the history of the
ICC’s involvement in Libya) (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
155
Press Release, Sec. Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes
Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on
Protesters, U.N. Press Release SC/10187/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 2011). These comments did not
necessarily refer to the referral itself, as the resolution contained other actions, such as an
arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze. See also Editorial, Libya Sanctions:
China’s New Role at the UN, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2011,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2011/0228/Libya-sanctionsChina-s-new-role-at-the-UN (reporting that approximately 30,000 Chinese, working
primarily in Libyan oil fields, had to flee the violence).
156
Editorial, Libya Sanctions: China’s New Role at the UN, supra note 155.
157
Michael Martina & Chris Buckley, China Urges Libya to Protect Investments, REUTERS,
Aug.
23,
2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/23/us-china-libya-oilidUSTRE77M0PD20110823.
158
Mark Kersten, China, the ICC and Libya: A New Level of Hypocrisy?, JUSTICE IN
CONFLICT, Mar. 2, 2011, http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/03/02/china-the-icc-and-libya-anew-level-of-hypocrisy/; UNSC Refers Situation in Libya to ICC, Sanctions Gaddafi &
Aides, SUDAN TRIB., Feb. 27, 2011, http://www.sudantribune.com/UNSC-refers-situationin-Libya-to,38116.
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to U.N. action combined with abstention or approval of U.N. measures at
the time of voting reflects its strategy of avoiding alienation of friends and
foes, and supports the argument that China’s strong verbal support for
Myanmar does not necessarily mean that it would veto a Commission of
Inquiry.159
There are some important differences between the Sudanese and
Libyan referrals. First, China not only permitted the Libyan referral
through abstention, it affirmatively approved it, signaling a growing
acceptance by China of Article 13(b). Second, the referral of Libya was
not preceded by a U.N. Commission of Inquiry,160 indicating China’s trust
in the ICC’s ability to investigate.
The referral of Libya appears to reflect a shift towards increased
use of the ICC by the Security Council, particularly because of the way
the referral was unanimously approved and because of the speed, only
eleven days after the outbreak of violence, with which the Security
Council was willing to get involved.161 Before the Libya referral, it would
have been reasonable to think that there might be no additional Article
13(b) referrals for a long time to come, due to the difficulty of arresting
and prosecuting the indicted Sudanese officials, which undermined the
ICC’s authority (and, indirectly, the Security Council as well). Instead,
the Libya referral reconfirmed the Security Council’s confidence in the
ICC.

V. CALLS FOR A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY AND THE POSSIBLE
REFERRAL OF MYANMAR TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
The seeds of conflict in Myanmar were planted even before the
country’s independence from Britain in 1948. 162 After independence,
Myanmar (then named Burma) had a parliamentary form of
government. 163 Outside the capital, however, communists and rebel
insurgents exercised considerable authority.164 In this context, the army
regarded its role to be the principal defender of a Burman state. 165
159

Libya is a relatively important trade partner for China, exporting 3% of China’s overall
oil imports, equivalent to about 10% of Libya’s oil exports. Martina & Buckley, supra
note 157.
160
UNSC Refers Situation in Libya to ICC, Sanctions Gaddafi & Aides, SUDAN TRIB.,
supra note 158.
161
The protests in Libya began on February 15, and the referral was made on February 26.
See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 42, at ¶ 4.
162
Tin Maung Maung Than, Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict
in Myanmar (Burma), in ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 65, 70–71 (Kusuma
Snitwongse & W. Scott Thompson eds., 2005).
163
ASHLEY SOUTH, ETHNIC POLITICS IN BURMA: STATES OF CONFLICT 27 (2008).
164
Id.
165
Id.
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Veterans of independence, recalling divisive colonial leadership and
anarchic wars, were determined to maintain national unity.166 Meanwhile,
ethnic minorities, called “ethnic nationalities,” 167 complained of
marginalization168 and began to claim social and political autonomy.169
Many began armed struggles, prompted by, inter alia, the desire for selfdetermination, the underdevelopment of outlying minority areas, and the
unequal distribution of wealth and power as compared to central
Myanmar.170 Claiming a threat of civil war, in 1958 military leaders
seized power through a coup consented to by the civilian government, and
governed for eighteen months.171 After handing the reins of leadership to
a civilian government for two years, the military determined that existing
leaders were incapable of resolving the country’s political and economic
problems.172 In 1962, a second military coup led to twenty-six years of
absolute rule by General Ne Win, under the military Revolutionary
Council; in 1974, his Burma Socialist Programme Party was
institutionalized in the Constitution as the country’s sole legitimate
political entity.173 Ethnic rebellions continued.174 In 1988, in response to
economic failures and civil oppression, protesters took to the streets.175
Under new leadership, the military once more took the reins of power,
promising multi-party elections while cracking down on students and
other activists, some of whom fled to border areas to join ethnic rebel
groups. 176 Hopes for reform were dashed when the junta refused to
transfer its power after the main opposition parties won nearly 90% of the
parliamentary seats in the 1990 military-sponsored elections.177 Beginning
in 1992, the government began organizing a National Convention to draft
a new constitution that was eventually approved in a National Referendum
in 2008.178 In November 2010, parliamentary elections were held, and, in
March 2011, a new President was chosen.179
166

Id.
Burmese usually use the term “ethnic nationalities” to refer to ethnic populations other
than the Burman majority. The terms “ethnic minorities” and “ethnic groups” are often
used outside Myanmar to describe ethnic populations. See SOUTH, supra note 163, at xv
(finding that elites within ethnic populations prefer the term “ethnic nationalities” because
it confers greater political status and legitimacy).
168
Tin Maung Maung Than, supra note 162, at 73–74.
169
SOUTH, supra note 163, at 29.
170
Seng Raw, Views from Myanmar: An Ethnic Perspective, in BURMA: POLITICAL
ECONOMY UNDER MILITARY RULE 159, 159–60 (Robert H. Taylor ed., 2001).
171
DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA: THE STATE OF MYANMAR 13 (2001).
172
Id.
173
See id. at 13–14.
174
Tin Maung Maung Than, supra note 162, at 76.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 76–77.
177
Id. at 77.
178
See Burma ‘Approves New Constitution’, BBC NEWS, May 15, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7402105.stm;
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
167

2012]

GAUGING COSTS TO CHINA OF ARTICLE 13(B) REFERRALS

363

Decades of conflict between the military and the ethnic
nationalities has led to multitudes of reports of widespread governmentperpetrated rape, torture, forced displacement, and other crimes, forming
the evidentiary basis for a Commission of Inquiry and potential referral of
Myanmar to the ICC.180 In June 2008, Amnesty International released
Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar, which focused on
violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law
CHRONOLOGY OF BURMA’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 3 (2008), available at
www.hrw.org/reports/2008/burma0508/burma0508chronology.pdf.
The
National
Convention and National Referendum were heavily criticized for their lack of
transparency, participation, and fairness. See, e.g., Vote to Nowhere, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (May 1, 2008), www.hrw.org/en/node/62239/section/1; THE PUB. INT’L LAW &
POL’Y GRP., BURMESE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM: NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR (2008),
available
at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/PILPG_Report_Burmese_Constitutional_Referendum
_Neither_Free_Nor_Fair-11_May_2008.pdf.
179
Kocha Olarn, Myanmar Swears in New President, CNN NEWS, Mar. 30, 2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-30/world/myanmar.new.government_1_prime-ministerthein-sein-military-junta-military-rule?_s=PM:WORLD.
180
See, e.g., ASSISTANCE ASS’N FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS (BURMA), THE DARKNESS WE
SEE: TORTURE IN BURMA’S INTERROGATION CENTERS AND PRISONS (2005), available at
www.aappb.org/tortour_report.pdf (detailing torture of political prisoners by government
authorities); KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GRP., FORCED LABOUR, MOVEMENT AND TRADE
RESTRICTIONS
IN
TOUNGOO
DISTRICT
(2010),
available
at
http://www.khrg.org/khrg2010/khrg10f2.pdf (documenting forced labor conscriptions by
the military between June 2009 and January 2010); KAREN WOMEN’S ORG., SHATTERING
SILENCES: KAREN WOMEN SPEAK OUT ABOUT THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME’S USE OF
RAPE AS A STRATEGY OF WAR IN KAREN STATE (2004), available at
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Initiatives/kwo_shatteringsilences_april2007.pdf
(documenting widespread and systematic rape by the Burmese military); ID., STATE OF
TERROR: THE ONGOING RAPE, MURDER, TORTURE AND FORCED LABOUR SUFFERED BY
WOMEN LIVING UNDER THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME IN KAREN STATE (2007), available
at www.karenwomen.org/Reports/state%20of%20terror%20report.pdf (reporting forced
labor, forced portering, rape, torture, and other crimes committed by the Burmese military
against the Karen ethnic population); ASHLEY SOUTH ET AL., DISPLACEMENT AND
DISPOSSESSION: FORCED MIGRATION AND LAND RIGHTS IN BURMA (2007), available at
http://www.ashleysouth.co.uk/files/COHRE_November_2007.pdf (focusing on land
confiscation by government officials, leading to forced displacement). Forced labor in
which the oppressor exercises “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership
over a person” is—pursuant to Rome Statute art. 7(2)(c)—the prosecutable crime of
slavery. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 32, art. 7(2)(c).
But see Trevor Wilson, Judging Burma’s Human Rights Abuses: Is There a Role for a
Commission
of
Inquiry?,
at
2,
available
at
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/asiarights/files/2011/12/Burma-Human-Rights.pdf,
(claiming that Myanmar army abuses “often occur in random, isolated incidents rather than
on a mass level,” that “few [human rights incidents], if any, have been independently
verified,” and that “many organisations producing [human rights] reports are not
independent, and not necessarily objective” (emphasis in original)). In response to
questions regarding the quality of the documentation of crimes in Myanmar, it is important
to remember that one of the primary purposes of a commission of inquiry is to impartially
investigate whether violations have occurred.
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committed in Kayin (or “Karen”) State and Bago Division of Myanmar
from 2005 to 2007. It found that, unlike in previous offensives, the
Myanmar army was primarily targeting civilians as part of official
government policy:
The following human rights violations have all taken
place on a widespread and systematic basis during the
military offensive: unlawful killings; torture and other illtreatment of detainees and prisoners; enforced
disappearances and arbitrary arrests; the imposition of
forced labour, portering, and displacement; and the
destruction or confiscation of crops and food-stocks and
other forms of collective punishment. These violations,
targeting civilians or carried out indiscriminately, have
been preceded or accompanied by consistent threats and
warnings by the tatmadaw [Myanmar army] that such
would occur, and by statements by Myanmar government
officials. Amnesty International is concerned that these
practices have been the result of official government and
tatmadaw policy, and amount to crimes against
humanity.181
Amnesty International concluded that, based on testimonies and
information collected, the “weight of evidence suggests that some of these
violations constitute crimes against humanity” as defined by the Rome
Statute. 182 At the time of the report, Amnesty International did not
specifically call for a Commission of Inquiry or an ICC referral.183 In
2010, it changed its position to full-fledged support of a Commission and,
should the Commission conclude that crimes have been committed, an
ICC referral. 184 Most recently, in 2012, Amnesty International has
suggested that a Myanmar domestic judicial process, in lieu of a U.N.
commission, could be appropriate.185
Additional evidentiary and analytical support for a Commission of
Inquiry was provided by Crimes in Burma, a May 2009 report by the
International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard University. Relying
exclusively on U.N. documents for its research, the Clinic concluded that
“there is a prima facie case of international criminal law violations that
181

AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 25, at 2.
Id. at 5.
183
Zawacki, supra note 35 (noting that at that time, political realities militated against the
likelihood of seeing a Commission of Inquiry established).
184
Id.; see also Myanmar: UN General Assembly Should Call for Commission of Inquiry,
AMNESTY INT’L, Sept. 6, 2010, http://www.amnesty.org.nz/news/myanmar-un-generalassembly-should-call-commission-inquiry.
185
See MYANMAR: REVISITING HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR, supra note 28, at 5.
182
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demands U.N. Security Council action to establish a Commission of
Inquiry to investigate these grave breaches further.”186 Notably, the report
found that U.N. officials were using precisely the language of the ICC
statute to describe the crimes in Myanmar and tying the crimes to
government policy: the forced relocation was “widespread and ‘part of a
deliberate strategy,’” 187 abuses including sexual violence were
“widespread and systematic,” 188 and extrajudicial killings were “a
deliberate strategy” and also “widespread and systematic.”189 The report
further found that the situation in Myanmar met the elements of a threat to
peace 190 and that the Myanmar government had failed to hold the
perpetrators accountable,191 clearing the path for a U.N. Security Council
referral and ultimately for ICC jurisdiction.192
It is unclear exactly when the connection between Myanmar and
the ICC was first made. Two of the earlier published analyses were made
by the Burma Lawyers’ Council, a group of Burmese lawyers in exile, and
by the Global Justice Center, a U.S.-based human rights organization, in
September 2007.193 A partnership was formed in that month between the
two groups with a view towards obtaining a U.N. Security Council
resolution forming an international Commission of Inquiry on human
rights violations and grave crimes.194 Subsequent months saw a number of
186

INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 25, at 3.
Id. at 48 (quoting Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, ¶ 47, U.N.
Doc.
A/61/369
(Sept.
21,
2006),
available
at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/530/70/PDF/N0653070.pdf?OpenElement). Ostensibly
to avoid creating threshold tests, few have tried to compare the atrocities in Myanmar and
in Darfur. The Harvard clinic reports that the number of destroyed villages is comparable.
INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 25, at iii, iv, 2, 88.
188
Id. at 62.
189
Id. at 71.
190
Id. at 89–90.
191
Id. at 75–76.
192
Id. at 92 (“[T]he Security Council should be prepared to act upon findings and
recommendations made by such a Commission, including a potential referral to the
International Criminal Court.”); see also Burma Briefing—The United Nations General
Assembly and Crimes in Burma, BURMA CAMPAIGN U.K., July 25, 2010, at 1, available at
http://burmacampaign.org.uk/images/uploads/2-UNGA-and-Burma.pdf (finding that past
General Assembly resolutions regarding Myanmar have related to “at least 15 possible war
crimes and crimes against humanity”); cf. INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., supra
note 25, at 25 (concluding that despite the difficulty in gathering evidence of crimes,
publicly-available sources reveal “a consistent pattern of widespread and systematic human
rights violations which constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined
under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute”).
193
Janet Benshoof, The Changing Landscape of International Law: The Global
Responsibility to Persecute Perpetrators of Grave Crimes Inflicted on the People of
Burma, 27 LAWKA PALA 37 (2007); Burma Lawyers’ Council, Legal Analysis of the Burma
Lawyers’ Council on Heinous Crimes in Burma, 27 LAWKA PALA 34 (2007).
194
Burma Lawyers’ Council & Global Justice Ctr., Extracts from MOU of BLC and GJC
for Joint Efforts of Criminal Accountability, 28 LAWKA PALA 32 (2007).
187
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statements by both organizations calling for criminal accountability in
Myanmar.195 By August 2008, key Burmese opposition groups such as the
National Council for the Union of Burma, Network for Human Rights
Documentation–Burma, and the Women’s League of Burma, as well as
international human rights organizations such as the International
Federation for Human Rights, the U.K.-based Burma Justice Committee,
and Christian Solidarity Worldwide, had either endorsed or joined in the
effort.196
As of September 2008, however, the interest of the international
community in bringing Myanmar before the ICC was still “lukewarm.”197
195

See, e.g., Burma Lawyers’ Council, Burma Lawyers’ Council Urges the United Nations
Security Council to Refer the Heinous Crimes in Burma to the International Criminal
Court, 30 LAWKA PALA 7 (2008); Burma Lawyers’ Council, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
Detention Should Be Added to the List of the SPDC’s Crimes Against Humanity, 30
LAWKA PALA 9 (2008); Burma Lawyers’ Council & Global Justice Ctr., International
Lawyers Call for Criminal Accountability for Myanmar Regime, 28 LAWKA PALA 35
(2007); Global Justice Ctr. et al., In the Wake of Historic Resolution 1820 on Sexual
Violence in Armed Conflict Women of Burma and International Lawyers Call on the
Security Council to Refer the Situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court, 30
LAWKA PALA 24 (2008); Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights et al., Catastrophe in Burma a
Wake Up Call to the International Community: Time to End Impunity for Heinous Crimes
by the Military Regime, 30 LAWKA PALA 22 (2008).
196
Burma Lawyers’ Council, Burma Lawyers’ Council Report on the Campaign for
Criminal Accountability, 30 LAWKA PALA 4, 5 (2008).
197
B.K. Sen, The International Criminal Court’s Indictment of the Sudanese President for
Genocide in Darfur and its Relevance to Burma, 31 LAWKA PALA 71, 72 (2008). Before
the recent reforms, critics of the formation of a commission of inquiry warned that it would
deter Myanmar military leaders from accepting democratic reforms. See, e.g., Colum
Lynch, U.S. Push for Burmese War Crimes Probe Hits Chinese Wall, FOREIGN POL’Y, Oct.
24,
2010,
http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/24/us_push_for_burmese_war_crimes_pr
obe_hits_chinese_wall (reporting on the low-profile and multilateral approach adopted by
the U.S. in seeking to establish a commission of inquiry with regards to atrocities in
Myanmar, and contrasting it with China’s “high-octane, Western-style diplomatic effort”
to oppose any such measure on grounds that a commission of inquiry “could undermine the
country’s fragile political transition”); see also Mark L. Goldberg, Momentum for Burma
Commission of Inquiry Seeming to Falter, Oct. 25, 2010, U.N. DISPATCH,
http://www.undispatch.com/momentum-for-burma-commission-of-inquiry-seeming-tofalter (citing Colum Lynch’s article in Foreign Policy and explaining that appointment of a
commission of inquiry on “human rights abuses by the Burmese junta” would likely be
“off the agenda” during Ban Ki Moon’s October 2010 visit to Southeast Asian countries
because of an absence of international support). Now, after reforms have begun, they fear
that a commission of inquiry would unfairly punish Myanmar and could cause the reforms
to unravel. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 180, at 8 (“Convening a UN Commission of
Inquiry at this time would be tantamount to imposing new sanctions on Burma at the very
time when it is making serious efforts to introduce change.”); Simon Roughneen, A
Decommissioned Inquiry on Myanmar, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 10, 2012,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NA10Ae01.html (“With the threat of
backsliding still looming large … some observers say that it is important to encourage
Thein Sein’s reform process and not play into the hands of hardliners by pushing for the
creation of a COI.”).
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An important turning point for criminal accountability efforts came in
May 2009 when key stakeholders met in Thailand to discuss the viability
of a Commission of Inquiry and an ICC referral. Over three days of
seminars and meetings, a wide variety of international human rights
organizations, legal and documentation experts, and Burmese advocates
debated the timing, usefulness, strategy of, and obstacles to, a
Commission of Inquiry and a potential U.N. Security Council referral.198
In a bizarre turn of events, rumors circulated that the Thai and Myanmar
governments had sent agents to infiltrate the meetings.199 The Myanmar
government had reportedly issued an arrest warrant for the General
Secretary of the Burma Lawyers’ Council (“BLC”)200 and was apparently
trying to either kidnap 201 or kill 202 him. As the author personally
experienced, attendees were advised to eat meals in a sheltered inner area
of the dining room of the hotel meeting venue. The BLC’s General
Secretary was spirited away to an anonymous hotel room,203 went into
hiding, and subsequently left the country for Sweden.204 The rumors of
spies in the May 2009 meetings created a clear impression: the Myanmar
government was concerned about a potential ICC referral. The BLC’s
General Secretary confirmed that a war crimes commission “very much
concerns the Burmese leadership”205 and the Director of Burma Campaign
UK commented that the provision in the 2008 Myanmar Constitution
granting government officials immunity from domestic criminal
prosecution “shows they’re worried” about international prosecution.206
198

Although names of attendees are omitted from this article for confidentiality purposes, a
partial list is publicly available. Burma Lawyers’ Council, Seminar on Criminal
Accountability in Burma: ‘Advancing Human Rights and Ending Impunity in Burma:
Which External Leverages?’, 33 LAWKA PALA 17 (2009).
199
Shirin Ebadi & Souhayr Belhassen, A Seminar Fraught with Risks, in FIDH/BLC
SEMINAR: ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENDING IMPUNITY IN BURMA: WHICH EXTERNAL
LEVERAGES?
3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_BLC_Burma_seminar_final_internet.pdf.
200
Press Release: Burma: Outlaw of the Burma Lawyers Council and Harassment of its
Members, INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, May 5, 2009, http://www.fidh.org/PressRelease-Burma-Outlaw-of-the-Burma-Lawyers?envoiamis=1.
201
Dan Withers, Aung Htoo, BLC: ‘Than Shwe Fears the ICC’, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF
BURMA, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.dvb.no/interview/aung-htoo-blc-%E2%80%98thanshwe-fears-the-icc%E2%80%99/12370.
202
Andrew Marshall, Putting Burma’s Junta on Trial, 33 LAWKA PALA 47, 48 (2009)
(relaying reports that Myanmar agents “had been dispatched to kidnap or kill” the General
Secretary).
203
Id.
204
Withers, supra note 201.
205
Marshall, supra note 202, at 49.
206
Id. at 48; see also INT’L CRISIS GRP., CHINA’S MYANMAR DILEMMA 30 (Int’l Crisis Grp.
Asia
Report
No.
177)
(2009),
available
at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-eastasia/177_chinas_myanmar_dilemma.pdf (commenting that a feeling of victimization on the
part of Myanmar’s then-leader, Senior General Than Shwe, was caused in part by fear of
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As awareness of crimes in Myanmar has increased, scores of
NGOs, members of governments, and prominent individuals have
expressed support for a Commission of Inquiry.207 Ultimately, however,
the support that truly matters is that of the U.N. Security Council
members; 208 significantly, three of the countries that have expressed
support—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are
permanent members of the fifteen-member body.209 China and Russia, the

prosecution for crimes against humanity). Not coincidentally, just days before the
Thailand meetings, the Myanmar government declared the BLC an “unlawful association,”
claiming that it was “hurtful to the rule of law in the Union of Myanmar, stability of the
state and community peace.” Myanmar Junta Declares Lawyers Council Unlawful,
MYANMA THADIN, May 1, 2009, http://www.myanmathadin.com/news/human-rights/268myanmar-junta-declares-lawyers-council-unlawful.html.
The so-called “immunity
provision” in Myanmar’s constitution provides that “[n]o proceeding shall be instituted
against the said Councils or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in
respect of any act done in the execution of their respective duties.” MYANMAR CONST. ch.
XIV § 445.
207
For a partial list, see Criminal Accountability: Support the Call for a Commission of
Inquiry on Crimes in Burma!: Updates, UNSCBURMA.ORG (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.unscburma.org/Crimes%20in%20Burma/ICC/Updates.php?Submit=Updates.
The website lists—among others supporting a Commission of Inquiry on Myanmar—the
following individuals, organizations, and associations: the International Burmese Monks
Organization, sixty British members of Parliament, President of East Timor and Nobel
Laureate José Ramos-Horta, Thai Member of Parliament and ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Myanmar Caucus President Kraisak Choonhavan, former U.N. Special Rapporteurs on the
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Yozo Yokota, fifty-five
members of the U.S. House of Representatives, former U.S. First Lady Laura Bush,
fourteen Nobel Laureates, the U.S. Campaign for Burma, 442 members of parliament from
twenty-nine countries, the U.K. Conservative Party’s Human Rights Commission,
UNISON (the U.K.’s second-largest trade union), current U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Tomás Ojea Quintana, the Karen National Union,
the European Karen Network, the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN–
Burma), the International Trade Union Confederation, thirty-seven Karen organizations
(representing the Karen ethnic nationality of Myanmar), the Nobel Women’s Initiative,
sixty-four women’s organizations from around the world, and thirty-two U.S. senators.
See also US Civil Society Urges More Myanmar Pressure, BRUNEI TIMES, July 8, 2011,
http://www.bt.com.bn/news-asia/2011/07/08/us-civil-society-urges-more-myanmarpressure (reporting that twenty-one U.S. civil society groups, including the AFL-CIO and
the Foreign Policy Initiative, joined together to pressure U.S. President Barack Obama to
provide support to a U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Myanmar crimes).
208
Views differ on whether cooperation from the Myanmar government would also be
essential. Compare Wilson, supra note 180, at 10 (arguing that without government
cooperation, a commission of inquiry “would have little prospect of being held or of
achieving useful outcomes”), with Burma: Q&A on an International Commission of
Inquiry, supra note 5 (explaining the rationale behind calls by Human Rights Watch for a
U.N. commission of inquiry on violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law in Myanmar, and contending that a lack of government cooperation “would not present
insurmountable challenges to conducting a valuable and needed inquiry”).
209
It is unclear whether these countries would continue to support a Commission of
Inquiry today. See, e.g., Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma, supra note 28, noting
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other two permanent members, have come out against such a move.
China has forcefully lobbied high-level United Nations, Asian, and
European officials, arguing that a Commission of Inquiry could undermine
Myanmar’s transition to democracy, and called such a commission
“dangerous and counterproductive” in a confidential meeting.210
But observers of China should not be surprised. China repeatedly
supported Sudan publicly: before, on the day of, and after its referral to
the ICC. China’s public statements seemed to have little to do with its
ultimate decision to allow Sudan to be referred. More relevant to China’s
decisions are the economic and political interests that determine its foreign
policy, and it is to those interests that we now turn.

VI. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SUDAN
In analyzing China’s economic relationships with Sudan and
Myanmar, this article aims to make three main points. First, China buys
important commodities from Sudan and Myanmar, particularly petroleum
and other natural resources, but its reliance on those countries—viewed as
a percentage of overall trade—is miniscule compared to Sudan’s and
Myanmar’s dependence on China.
The economic power in the
relationships is so heavily weighted in China’s favor that Sudan and
Myanmar are simply unable to credibly threaten China’s economic wellbeing without completely undermining their own economies and thus their
ruling parties’ political power. Conversely, an angered China in a mood
to retaliate could quickly cause economic crises in Sudan or Myanmar
with negligible effect on its own economy. Second, China’s imports from
Sudan, in particular its energy imports, are appreciably larger than China’s
imports from Myanmar. Thus, it follows that China would be even less
threatened, from an economic perspective, by Myanmar’s negative
reaction to an ICC referral than it ought to have been with Sudan. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, China’s economic relationship with Sudan
appears not to have been adversely affected by the 2005 referral of Sudan
to the ICC. Oil imports thereafter continued to increase while overall
trade, although at times surging and dropping, remained healthy.211 There
is little reason to believe, therefore, that a Chinese abstention on the
creation of a Commission of Inquiry or on a referral of Myanmar to the
ICC would harm China’s economic interests.

comments on the part of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reflecting a newfound
willingness to consider accepting Myanmar domestic accountability mechanisms.
210
Dan Withers, China Sabotaging UN War Crimes Probe, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF
BURMA, Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.dvb.no/news/china-sabotaging-un-war-crimesprobe/12420.
211
See tables 1–3, infra Parts VI and VII.
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It is no exaggeration to say that China is the world’s growing
economic giant. Measured by gross domestic product, China overtook
Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy during the second
quarter of 2010,212 and it is on course to becoming the world’s largest
economy by 2020.213 From 1989 to 2010, China’s average annual GDP
growth was a stunning 9.3%.214 In comparison, the U.S. growth rate from
1948 to 2011 was a mere 3.25%. 215 From 2000 to 2009, China’s
worldwide exports rose from USD $249 billion to $1.201 trillion, while its
imports rose from USD $225 billion to $1.005 trillion.216
China’s dramatic growth has resulted in an almost insatiable
hunger for energy. Between 2000 and 2005, its energy consumption rose
over 78%.217 China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of
coal, 218 and it is the second-largest consumer of oil, behind only the
United States.219 Understandably, China’s astonishing growth has had the
result of steadily increasing China’s dependence on foreign oil. In 2003, it
became the world’s second-largest oil importer.220 According to forecasts
by the International Energy Agency, China’s ratio of imported to total
consumed oil was expected to hit 61% by 2010 and 76.9% by 2020, and
its domestic production is expected to be stagnant.221 Directly related to
China’s need for oil is its growing demand for cars: it has been estimated
that China’s total number of cars will increase twentyfold between 2002
and 2030, to 390 million.222
212

China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug.
16, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/china-economy-passes-japan-s-insecond-quarter-capping-three-decade-rise.html.
213
Simon Kennedy, G-7 Will Be Eclipsed by E-7 by 2020 as China Surges, PwC Says,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
Jan.
21,
2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awJGPSXwf4DE.
214
China
GDP
Growth
Rate,
TRADING
ECON.,
available
at
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth.
215
United States GDP Annual Growth Rate, TRADING ECON., available at
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth-annual.
216
US-China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, U.S.-CHINA BUS.
COUNCIL, http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (last visited July 25, 2012). All
dollar amounts in this article are cited in U.S. dollars.
217
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at 1.
218
Country
Analysis
Briefs:
China,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH (last updated Oct. 16, 2011).
219
Id.
220
Zhang Jianxin, Oil Security Reshapes China’s Foreign Policy 1 (Hong Kong U. of Sci.
and Tech. Ctr. on China’s Transnational Relations, Working Paper No. 9, 2006), available
at http://www.marshallfoundation.org/documents/ChinaForeignPolicyEnergy.pdf.
221
Id. at 5; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at ii (stating that, as of 2008,
China needed 6.6 million barrels of oil per day).
222
Joyce Dargay et al., Vehicle Ownership and Income Growth, Worldwide: 1960–2030,
ENERGY J., Oct. 2007, at 143, 168; see also Pablo Bustelo, China and Oil in the Asian
Pacific Region, NEW ENGLAND J. PUB. POL’Y, July 2007, at 171, 172, available at
http://www.ucm.es/info/eid/pb/Bustelo07nejpp%20-%20Pub.pdf (“China could increase its
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Recalling that China’s leaders believe that domestic political
stability—and survival of the ruling party—can only be preserved through
continued economic growth, as China’s domestic energy resources have
declined, it is no surprise that it has increasingly looked abroad for natural
resources to sustain its growth. As a result, trade between Africa and
China has grown dramatically.223 In 2009, China surpassed the United
States as Africa’s top trading partner,224 with trade exceeding USD $100
billion per annum.225
Sudan is China’s third-largest African trading partner. 226 The
1990s saw a strengthening of their economic relationship, primarily due to
international isolation of Sudan because of its ties to terrorism, and
China’s search for unexploited oil opportunities.227 Oil is the basis of the
Sudan-China trade. Although China’s oil interests in Africa are still
relatively minor compared to the investments of international oil
companies, China’s involvement in Sudan is an exception.228 Over 60%
of Sudan’s oil is sold to China, comprising more than 6% of China’s
imported oil. 229 Nine out of ten shipped barrels of Sudanese oil are
destined for China.230 In 2010, fuel and mining products made up 88% of
Sudan’s merchandise exports, with China receiving nearly 65% of all
oil consumption by an average of about 4.5% per year over the next two decades, more
than doubling the same figure for the world as a whole and more than quadrupling the
consumption increases forecast for developed western countries.”).
223
Jian-Ye Wang & Abdoulaye Bio-Tchané, Africa’s Burgeoning Ties with China:
Maximizing the Benefits of China’s Increasing Economic Engagement with Africa, FIN. &
DEV.,
Mar.
2008,
at
44,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/03/pdf/wang.pdf (describing burgeoning
trade between the two regions).
224
South Africa: China Now Top Trading Partner, AFR. PRESS INT’L, Oct. 1, 2009,
http://africanpress.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/south-africa-china-now-top-trading-partner.
225
Ed Cropley & Ben Hirschler, China Overtakes US as Africa’s Top Trading Partner,
BUS. DAILY, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate%20News//539550/850122/-/item/1/-/8r3t1p/-/index.html.
226
Denine Walters, Sino-Sudanese Relations: The Importance of Oil and the 2011
Referendum,
CONSULTANCY
AFR.
INTELLIGENCE,
Apr.
30,
2010,
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=389:
sino-sudanese-relations-the-importance-of-oil-and-the-2011-referendum&catid=58:asiadimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264.
227
Daniel Large, Arms, Oil and Darfur—The Evolution of Relations Between China and
Sudan,
7
SUDAN
ISSUE
BRIEF
2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-7-Arms.pdf; Walters, supra note
226; see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Far Away from Darfur’s Agony, Khartoum Is Booming,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/23/world/africa/23ihtweb.1024sudan.3262080.html?_r=1 (reporting that foreign direct investment in Sudan
increased from USD $128 million in 2000 to USD $2.6 billion in 2008).
228
Erica S. Downs, The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations, CHINA SEC.
(Summer 2007), at 42, 44; see also Zhang, supra note 220, at 9 (reporting that, in 2004,
45% of China’s imported oil came from the Middle East, while 28.7% came from Africa).
229
Walters, supra note 226.
230
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at i.
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exported merchandise; the second-highest destination was the United Arab
Emirates, at 10.5%.231
China also controls almost all of Sudan’s potential oil.232 Stateowned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China’s largest
producer and supplier of crude oil and natural gas, 233 is the largest
shareholder of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, Sudan’s
largest oil company, owning 40% of its stock.234 Meanwhile, China has
been Sudan’s principal partner in developing the capacity to transport and
extract oil,235 and Chinese companies have dominated the construction of
Sudan’s energy infrastructure, including pipelines, marine terminals, and
refineries:
In short, Sudan’s oil development has, by and large, been
a Chinese production. Beijing’s companies pump oil
from numerous key fields, which then courses through
Chinese-made pipelines to Chinese-made storage tanks to
await a voyage to buyers, most of them Chinese.236
The following chart (Table 1) illustrates how Sudan’s dramatic increase in
oil exports, before and shortly after the ICC referral, was almost
exclusively fuelled by China’s thirst for petroleum.
Table 1. Sudanese Oil Exports, in Millions of USD237
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HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at i.
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clear that Sudan’s oil is important to China, China has a number of other
major petroleum investments around the world. Analysts predict that the
Middle East will supply 70% of China’s oil imports in 2025, twice the
2005 figure.238 China’s trade with Sudan is just one small piece in this
enormous economic puzzle. Sudan, in contrast, is almost cripplingly
dependent on China. China is Sudan’s primary political, economic, and
military partner.239 Their ties have led to a relationship in which “China’s
support dominates the country’s economy.” 240 80% of the Sudanese
government’s revenues come from oil, and over 60% of that oil is sold to
China.241 China is Sudan’s largest trading partner, purchasing 71% of its
total exports in 2007242 and 65% in 2009.243
Economic ties and the imbalance in power between the two
countries were almost certainly important considerations for China when
determining whether to abstain from the Sudanese referral. In Part VII we
look at how China would make a similar calculation with respect to
Myanmar.

VII. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH MYANMAR
Like Sudan, Myanmar is an important Chinese ally. Since 1988,
when the Myanmar military government’s crackdown on democratic
demonstrations isolated it from the West, the country’s political,
diplomatic, security, and economic ties with China have strengthened.244
China’s roots are planted deeply in Myanmar’s economy. Heavily
invested in infrastructure, Chinese companies have constructed numerous
hydropower plants, including a USD $1 billion project on Myanmar’s
Salween River,245 and a thermal power station, accounting for around one
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Bustelo, supra note 222, at 172.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ICC CHARGES IN DARFUR AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 3
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240
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at 10. But see Li Anshan, China and Africa:
Policy and Challenges, CHINA SEC. (Summer 2007), at 69 (asserting that China is more
dependent on Africa than vice versa).
241
Walters, supra note 226.
242
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ICC CHARGES IN DARFUR AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION,
supra note 239, at 3.
243
See U.N. COMMODITY TRADE STATISTICS DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/db/ (last
visited July 25, 2012) (reporting that in 2009, Sudan’s total exports to the world
approximated USD $9.0 billion, while its exports to China approximated USD $5.9 billion).
244
Toshihiro Kudo, Myanmar’s Economic Relations with China: Can China Support the
Myanmar Economy?, at 4 (Inst. of Dev. Economies, Discussion Paper No. 66, July 2006),
available at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/066.pdf.
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Larry Jagan, China: The Junta’s Best Friend, MYANMAR ETHNIC ROHINGYAS HUMAN
RIGHTS ORG. MALAYSIA (MEHROM),
Aug.
12,
2011,
available
at
http://merhrom.wordpress.com/2008/08/12/china-the-junta%E2%80%99s-best-friend.
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third of Myanmar’s total energy generation capacity. 246 China also
provides a significant amount of economic assistance in the form of
interest-free loans.247
As with Sudan, a large part of China’s economic interest in
Myanmar revolves around Myanmar’s natural resources. Myanmar has
the fastest-growing oil and gas industry in Southeast Asia, with natural gas
its largest source of export revenue.248 In exchange for China’s help,
Myanmar grants it privileges regarding oil and gas rights.249 China’s
agreement to USD $300 million in trade deals and financial assistance in
2005 was crucial in securing Myanmar’s acquiescence for parallel
pipelines transporting natural gas from Myanmar and oil from Africa and
the Middle East.250
That gas pipeline is critical for China to meet its growing need for
natural gas: from 2000 to 2008, China’s natural gas consumption more
than tripled, rising at a double-digit rate.251 In 2008, China imported 4%
of its natural gas; predictions are that by 2030 it will be importing between
54% and 65%.252 And the oil pipeline has both economic and strategic
benefits for China.253 It is reportedly capable of reducing China’s reliance
on the Malacca Strait, which runs between Malaysia and Indonesia, by one
third.254 Nearly 80% of China’s imported oil passes through the Strait.255
Fees that Myanmar will collect for delivering oil will likely reach USD
$14 million per year.256 Over thirty years, the pipelines should yield USD
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Kudo, supra note 244, at 13–14.
Id. at 15; see also Jagan, supra note 245 (reporting that in January 2003, China supplied
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Id. But see Michael Lelyveld, Mideast Oil Drives China Disputes, RADIO FREE ASIA,
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$1 billion or more for Myanmar, equal on an annual basis to one-third of
its existing foreign exchange reserves.257
Looking at overall trade between the countries, it is evident that
China is vital to the success of Myanmar and its government. Some even
argue that the Myanmar military regime would not have survived without
China’s aid.258 Border trade with China has been called the “lifeline” of
Myanmar’s economy.259 In 1988, total trade between the two nations was
USD $9.51 million, by 2000 it had grown to USD $621.26 million,260 and
by 2010 it had reached USD $4.44 billion.261 As a result of an imbalance
in production of manufactured goods, Myanmar’s lack of domestic capital,
and over-bureaucratization, Myanmar has consistently faced significant
trade deficits with China.262 Myanmar’s exports to China increased by 1.3
times from 1988 to 2003, but its imports increased by 7.1 times.263
Despite strengthening economic ties between China and Myanmar,
trade between the countries remains a tiny percentage of China’s overall
trade. Trade from Yunnan Province, bordering Myanmar, constituted
73% of Myanmar’s overall border trade, yet the amount of goods flowing
through Yunnan’s capital was less than 1% of China’s overall trade.264
Additionally, despite the well-publicized oil trade between the nations,
Myanmar is not considered a major energy supplier to China,265 and on a
global scale its proven oil reserves are “quite small.”266 In 1994, 56% of
China’s imported oil came from the Asia-Pacific region, but by 2001 it
was only 15%.267 In 2011, about 80% of China’s oil came from the
Middle East and Africa, and the proportion from those regions was
expected to rise.268 Furthermore, the pipeline to bring crude oil from the
Middle East through Myanmar, despite its geopolitical importance, will
257
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See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GRP., CHINA’S MYANMAR DILEMMA, supra note 206, at 1; Zou
Keyuan, China’s Possible Role in Myanmar’s National Reconciliation, 17 COPENHAGEN J.
ASIAN STUD. 59, 66 (2003).
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dominating Myanmar’s trade”); Smith & Htoo, supra note 248, at 221 (noting that
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Shee, supra note 259, at 43.
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note 245 (reporting that from 1999 to 2005, Myanmar’s trade with China doubled, with
China becoming Myanmar’s largest source of imports, accounting for more than 31% in
2006).
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Shee, supra note 259, at 45–47.
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Id. at 10–11.
265
Id. at 18.
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have only a marginal impact on China’s overall energy security, delivering
only 11% of China’s current oil imports.269 That amount is not expected
to increase significantly: 78% of China’s oil imports in 2015 and 89% in
2030 are expected to still come from maritime transport.270 Thus, while
Myanmar is clearly a key trade partner for China, as China’s economy
grows and it spreads its trade further and further abroad, Myanmar’s
importance to it will continue to wane.
How does China’s trade with Myanmar compare to its trade with
Sudan? In 2010, Sudan was ranked the 28th-largest exporter of goods to
China, whereas Myanmar was not in the top fifty.271 However, Myanmar
topped Sudan in importing Chinese goods, where Myanmar was 40th, at
0.2%, and Sudan was not in the top fifty.272 In overall trade with China,
Sudan ranked 34th, and Myanmar 46th.273 But more significant than these
rankings are the relative amounts of trade shown by the following two
tables.
Table 2. Imports to the P.R.C. (excluding Hong Kong and
Macao) from Sudan and Myanmar, 2000–2010, in Millions of
USD274
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Jan.
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Table 3. Exports from the P.R.C. (excluding Hong Kong and
Macao) to Sudan and Myanmar, 2000–2010, in Millions of
USD275
3500	
  
3000	
  
2500	
  
2000	
  
1500	
  
1000	
  
500	
  
0	
  

Sudan	
  
Myanmar	
  

2000	
   2001	
   2002	
   2003	
   2004	
   2005	
   2006	
   2007	
   2008	
   2009	
   2010	
  

Table 2 demonstrates that Sudan’s exports to China dwarf
Myanmar’s. This is a critical difference that supports the argument that
China would show less compunction in referring Myanmar to the ICC
than it showed Sudan. In imports, the countries remained close for most
of the 2000s, with Myanmar taking a measurable lead in 2010. On an
aggregate basis, Myanmar is apparently a more valuable import partner
than Sudan, although it is surprising how close the numbers are given
Sudan’s geographical distance from China.
Moving from a comparison between the two countries to a
comparison of them with the rest of the world, it becomes clear that both
have little economic leverage. In 2010, China’s imports from Myanmar
were 0.07% of China’s total imports, less than one tenth of one percent.276
Imports from Sudan were 0.48% of China’s total.277 China’s exports to
Myanmar in the same year were 0.22% of China’s total exports, while
exports to Sudan were 0.12%.278
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under study. Thus, export data from the China reporter were used to show trade from
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trade from China to Sudan.
276
Id. China’s total imports worldwide in 2010 were worth approximately USD $1.4
trillion, of which imports from Myanmar totaled approximately USD $966 million.
277
Id. Imports to China from Sudan in 2010 were approximately USD $6.7 billion. This
number does not account for different types of imports, and some imports like petroleum
and natural gas—the primary products that Myanmar sells to China—are arguably more
critical to China than other goods. Moreover, economics is just one factor of many that
influence foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, the comparative insignificance of
Myanmar and Sudan within China’s overall trade portfolio is startling.
278
Id. China’s total exports worldwide in 2010 were approximately USD $1.6 trillion; of
that total, exports to Myanmar were approximately USD $3.5 billion, and to Sudan
approximately USD $2 billion.
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In contrast to China’s diversified trade, Myanmar and Sudan are
almost completely dependent upon China.
In 2010, China was
Myanmar’s largest import and third-largest export partner, ranking second
in overall trade only behind Thailand.279 In the same year, China was
Sudan’s top importer, top exporter, and top overall trade partner.280
These economic statistics do not predetermine China’s foreign
policy decisions, in the Security Council or otherwise. They nevertheless
reveal important relationships that must be taken into account when
predicting Chinese diplomatic decisions. In the cases of Sudan and
Myanmar, these statistics show that China enjoys enormous disparities in
economic leverage and power.

VIII. CHINA’S POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SUDAN
Political and diplomatic relations are less concrete and more
difficult to compare than economic data, especially with regards to nations
as secretive as China, Myanmar, and Sudan.
Nevertheless, an
examination of China’s political relationships similarly reveals that the
price for China of acting adversely to Sudan and Myanmar is lower than
one might anticipate. As international pariahs, Sudan and Myanmar have
little ability to provide meaningful diplomatic support to China, compared
to China’s capacity to use its substantial international leverage to protect
them.
For over fifty years, China has considered African countries
diplomatically important.281 It has had long and positive relations with
Sudan, built on an established framework of cooperation, including ties
between political leaders and business elites. 282 Historically, China’s
diplomatic approach to Sudan has been characterized by its support for
Sudan’s sovereignty, partiality for Sudanese or African mediation
processes, and opposition to sanctions—particularly petroleum
sanctions.283 China has been a relatively reliable defender of Sudan on the
U.N. Security Council.284 In exchange, China receives diplomatic benefits
such as support in defeating Taiwan’s application for membership in the
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United Nations 285 and rejection of human rights proposals against
China.286 Sudan has come to trust China.287
China’s political support for Sudan is focused on two areas:
military cooperation and protection at the United Nations.288 China is
“Sudan’s primary provider of small arms, a major supplier of advanced
weapons systems, and Khartoum’s most powerful military partner.”289 It
uses the weapons trade to increase political power and gain access to
valuable natural resources.290 Since 2004, China has sold on average 90%
of Sudan’s small arms.291 Notwithstanding a U.N. ban on arms provision
and sale in the Darfur region, the United Nations found that most small
arms used in the Darfur conflict were manufactured in China. 292
Reportedly, many of these weapons found their way to the Janjaweed
militias. 293 Military aircraft, including fighter jets and transport
helicopters, were imported from China throughout the 1990s.294 In sum,
China has become Sudan’s “military mentor.”295
China’s military relationship with Sudan has had myriad benefits
for China, strengthening political ties and helping China to obtain Sudan’s
political support when needed. It has also incentivized Sudan to continue
to give China preferences in the oil trade, helped China recoup some of its
expenditures on petroleum, provided an outlet for outdated weaponry no
285
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longer needed by the Chinese military, and armed the security forces
tasked with protecting China’s oil fields and facilities in Sudan.296
The crisis in Darfur made the China-Sudan relationship a subject
of international scrutiny, consequently compelling China to play a more
active role in Sudanese politics than it might otherwise have chosen.297 In
Darfur, China was caught between defending a marginalized ally and
improving its international image:
Darfur also placed Beijing [in] a dilemma between two
diverging aspects of its new diplomatic standards. On the
one side is the traditional emphasis on sovereignty and
non-interference, principles that proved to be lucrative to
carve out economic deals in Sudan and elsewhere in
Africa. . . . On the other side we find constructive
engagement . . . necessary to maintain good relations with
other world powers and to play a role in multilateral
organisations.298
The Darfur situation, in fact, illustrates the “breaking down” of
China’s strict adherence to non-interference. 299 While China officially
continues to propound its historical respect for sovereignty, increasing—
and negative—media attention, combined with a realization by China that
its desire for international prestige depends to some degree on its active
participation in world affairs, have led it to be more willing than ever to
use its position to influence Sudan.300
As an illustration of this shift to the center, China has continued to
give only qualified support for Sudan at the United Nations. For instance,
in connection with the Security Council resolution condemning the
violence in Darfur and declaring the situation a threat to international
peace and security, China’s veto threat resulted in the removal of language
approving economic sanctions.301 Nonetheless, in abstaining from the
final vote, China allowed the resolution to pass.302 Later in 2004, the issue
of sanctions was raised again, but disappeared due to Chinese
objections.303 Yet China still permitted the passage of Resolution 1564,
296
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which included the request for a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the
Darfur situation.304 These instances exemplify China’s strong stance in
protecting its economic interests by refusing to endorse sanctions, while
still permitting crucial censure of an ally and eventual ICC referral.305 As
an indication of Sudan’s subservience to China, Sudanese President alBashir praised China and the other countries that abstained, saying they
were Sudan’s “true friends”—despite China’s refusal to use its veto.306
At the U.N. Commission of Human Rights, and at its successor
agency, the U.N. Human Rights Council, China has followed a similar
pattern. In 2006, China defended Sudan following a report on human
rights abuses by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Sudan.307 That same year, China helped pass a Human Rights
Council resolution calling for the cessation of human rights violations in
Darfur, but only after successfully voting against and helping to remove
language recognizing Sudan’s responsibility to protect against human
rights abuses and language recognizing the importance of criminal
accountability. 308 China’s policy of combining support with criticism
continued when it welcomed a mission to Darfur but then later objected to
the mission’s report.309 While criticism of China is certainly justified
when it votes against language condemning its abusive allies, it is equally
important to recognize how rarely China actually uses its veto power.
China’s diplomatic position regarding the presence of U.N.
peacekeeping troops in Darfur further reflected the delicate balance
between supporting its economic and political ally and simultaneously
maintaining international credibility and prestige. After the Darfur Peace
Agreement was signed in May 2006, the Sudanese government, ostensibly
worried about Western imperialism, strongly opposed a peacekeeping
force. 310 After the African Union came out in support of troops,
conditioned on their acceptance by Sudan, China also announced its
304
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willingness to support the force.311 China’s suggestion that the Sudanese
government’s consent be required was rejected, although the final
resolution “invited” consent.312 Abstaining from the vote on Resolution
1706, China even accepted that U.N. troops could use force.313
With Sudan continuing to object, and international pressure
accumulating, in August and September 2006, Chinese diplomats began
expressing “displeasure” and sending a “strong message” that Sudan
should accept the peacekeepers.314 In February 2007, China’s president
visited Sudan, where he wrote off millions of dollars worth of debt, and
gave a multi-million-dollar interest-free loan to al-Bashir for a new
presidential palace.315 In March 2007, China applied additional pressure
by removing Sudan from its list of preferred trade partners, thereby
eliminating special incentives for Chinese businesses investing there.316 In
April 2007, China’s assistant foreign minister continued to both prod and
support Sudan, calling for increased Sudanese flexibility, while also
opposing sanctions.317 Finally, China’s ambassador to the United Nations
convinced Sudan to accept a hybrid United Nations and African Union
force.318 China quickly took credit for the breakthrough, claiming that
China’s diplomatic work was “inseparable” from Sudan’s acceptance of
the peacekeepers.319 The efforts received praise from abroad.320
311
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Critics of China’s relationship with Sudan have suggested that
China has been an inflexibly staunch supporter of Sudan at the United
Nations.
Human Rights First argues:
“[a]t almost every turn,
international efforts to protest and end the suffering in Darfur have
collided with China’s willingness to stand up for Khartoum. China has
consistently deflected pressure, emboldened its obstructionism and, of
course, protected the two nations’ myriad deals and connections.”321 Yet
China’s voting record reflects a more nuanced approach. Despite watering
down language, threatening vetoes, and blocking sanctions, between 2001
and 2007, on twenty-two Security Council resolutions on Sudan, China
never used its veto power, abstained eight times, and voted in favor
fourteen times. 322 Thus, while China clearly remained a reluctant
participant in Security Council action in Sudan, when push came to shove,
it did not wholeheartedly support its ally. Furthermore, in a move that
“would have been unimaginable in the past,” China’s special envoy to
Darfur met with rebel leaders, directly contravening China’s historical
policy of never dealing directly with anti-government leaders out of
respect for national sovereignty.323 Darfur forced China to balance its
traditional principles and economic interests with its desire for long term
stability and its need to satisfy international expectations. 324 This
balancing of interests explains, to some degree, China’s abstentions:
China often runs into a dilemma between international
justice and overseas interests. . . . Diplomatically, China
is neither willing to directly conflict with the western
countries who are often under the excuse for safeguarding
human rights nor able to hold a clear position against the
Sudanese government. Here, the abstaining becomes a
reluctant but necessary option.325
2009.state.gov/s/d/2007/83417.htm (quoting the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State’s
acknowledgment of Chinese assistance in convincing Sudan to accept U.N. troops); see
also Large, supra note 227, at 9 (relating that, after sanctions were dropped, U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1769, which created a 20,000-strong U.N. force, was adopted
unanimously). For the text of the resolution, see S.C. Res. 1769, at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007) (authorizing deployment of 19,555 military personnel).
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The Sudanese government was reportedly quite angered about
China’s 2005 abstention on its ICC referral.326 Yet both nations appear to
have treated it as a mere blip in a long history of close relations. Highlevel meetings between military officials from the two countries continued
between 2005 and 2007, 327 the years when the referral would have
affected relations most. Since then, the Chinese Embassy in the United
Kingdom has continued to designate Sudan publicly as a close ally.328 In
2008, al-Bashir said that following the withdrawal of many multinational
oil companies, Sudan was able to “turn to the East [Asia], and the East has
never let us down.”329 In fact, according to Human Rights First, “[t]he
relationship between the two governments has grown stronger while the
violence in Darfur continues.”330
The relationship remains strong despite China’s refusal to
unconditionally support Sudan because although on the surface the two
nations appear to treat each other as equals, their political alliance is
characterized by the same unequal division of power that is evident in
their economic relationship. Though Sudan may be able to assist China in
some instances, China is “widely recognized as critical to Khartoum’s . . .
international relations.”331 A statement by the Chinese special envoy on
Darfur is revealing: “[Sudan is] just like a child. If you judge him to be a
bad child, when he does something good you should give him a little
encouragement and say some nice things.”332
There are clearly some lessons to be learned from China’s
political relationship with Sudan. First, China objects loudly to what it
considers violations of national sovereignty, especially when they may
affect economic relations, but will stray from this position when a larger
interest, such as its desire to maintain its international image, is at stake.
Second, China often abstains as a means to placate an ally and the
international community at the same time. Third, when an ally is in a
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position of almost utter economic and diplomatic dependence, the
potential cost to China of angering that ally is more acceptable.

IX. CHINA’S POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MYANMAR
A. Political Relations Between China and Myanmar, 1949–2010
The factor that weighs most heavily in Myanmar’s favor when
considering whether China would veto a Commission of Inquiry or ICC
referral is its geopolitical importance to China. Unlike Sudan, Myanmar
lies on China’s border, separating China’s inland provinces from the sea.
The stability of Myanmar, both political and economic, has direct
repercussions on China; war, HIV and AIDS, drugs, and other problems
along the border directly affect Chinese citizens. Because of its key
location, Myanmar’s condition influences the stability of the entire
region’s economic, political, security, and military affairs. This Section
(A) addresses the history of the nations’ diplomatic relationship, the
strength of their military ties, the stability of their border, burgeoning rifts
in their alliance, and China’s 2007 veto of a Security Council resolution
critical of Myanmar.
Due to its enormous size, geographic proximity, exploding
population, and economic might, China casts a long shadow over
Southeast Asian nations,333 which it considers crucial to its interests and
security.334 Stability in the area is a top Chinese priority.335 China and
Myanmar’s relationship since the 1990s has been one of wary friendship.
Border issues, political instability, and Myanmar’s status as an
international pariah have all strained their relationship. Nonetheless,
China has been Myanmar’s most important ally. It is too soon to say what
type of relationship China will develop with Myanmar’s new government,
but in regularly defending Myanmar at the international level, China has
shown that its interests in political stability and friendly relations with its
neighbors are just as crucial to it as its economic interests.
China and Myanmar’s relationship dates back to A.D. 122.336
Since the founding of the P.R.C. in 1949, relations have been generally
stable.337 Ambivalent peaceful co-existence has evolved into strategic
alignment.338 In 1960, the two countries signed a formal treaty agreeing
that their relationship would be based on the five “principles of peaceful
333
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co-existence” China had articulated as the foundation for relations with
other nations: (i) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;
(ii) mutual non-aggression; (iii) mutual non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefits; and (v) peaceful coexistence.339 As neighbors, the countries proceeded to sign a number of
agreements reiterating and expanding on this pledge of cooperation.340
Friendly visits by high-level officials of both countries have been
extensive. 341 China and Myanmar have always called each other
“paukthaw” (“brother”), a word Myanmar reserves only for China.342
A turning point in recent China-Myanmar relations came when
Myanmar was isolated by the West following its refusal to honor the
results of its 1990 democratic election.343 The economic situation became
dire, and Myanmar had little choice but to turn to China.344 Since then,
Myanmar has cultivated close ties with China.345 In 1991, the two nations
agreed that neither would allow outsiders to impose Western human rights
values on their domestic affairs.346 In 2000, China reaffirmed its respect
for Myanmar’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, while Myanmar
agreed to recognize that Taiwan was part of China.347 In 2004, during a
visit to China by Myanmar’s prime minister, the countries again
acknowledged and promised to continue their historical friendship.348 In
June 2011, the countries “upgraded” their relationship, signing a number
of trade agreements, and reaffirming their mutually beneficial friendship
and cooperation.349
Several features of Myanmar’s location make it of special interest
to China: (i) Myanmar lies at an economic and strategic crossroads where
South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia meet;350 (ii) Myanmar shares its
longest border with China;351 and (iii) Myanmar controls China’s access to
339
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the Indian Ocean.352 China’s policies towards Myanmar reflect its multifaceted interest in the country. China seeks to: (i) preserve regional
stability; (ii) continue its economic growth and modernization; (iii)
maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors; (iv) keep open a trade route
to Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, and India; and (v) develop its southwestern
inland provinces.353 To protect its power and access to trade, China has
been building a string of ports from the South China Sea towards the
Persian Gulf; several of these are located in Myanmar. 354 China’s
construction of coastal ports and bases along the Indian Ocean has been
called the “grand prize” of China’s relationship with Myanmar, due to the
utility of an increased ability to monitor movements on the Indian
Ocean.355
As with China and Sudan, military ties between China and
Myanmar have been a key feature of their relationship.356 After 1988,
Myanmar abandoned its policy—grounded in a position of Cold War
neutrality—of refusing large weapons deals.357 Instead, it launched an
ambitious overhaul of its armed forces.358 Since Western countries were
unwilling to sell it arms, Myanmar became largely reliant upon China.359
China remains Myanmar’s largest supplier of military weaponry.360 In
1989, a Myanmar military delegation agreed to a package of military
expenditures totaling approximately USD $1.4 billion, which included
helicopters, attack planes, cruise missiles, and tanks.361 As of 2005, China
had provided USD $1.6 billion in military assistance. 362 Aside from
purely commercial motives, China benefits from the complications that an
armed Myanmar causes its rival India.363 It also appears that China’s
access to Myanmar’s Indian Ocean naval bases came in exchange for arms
assistance.364
Despite close ties, the relationship between China and Myanmar
has been characterized as “a marriage of convenience rather than a love
match.”365 There are strains originating from both sides. China’s rise has
352
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created an unbalanced alliance. Before China became a global power,
Myanmar played an important role in its foreign policy. But now their
imbalance in prestige and economic strength makes China critical to
Myanmar’s foreign policy, while “Myanmar is currently a low priority for
China.”366 China’s friendship with Myanmar has also become an irritant
in China’s relationship with the West.367 Tensions also arise because
Myanmar’s arguable instability and inept government threaten Chinese
investments.368
China is increasingly worried about instability on the 2,192kilometer China-Myanmar border.369 Over 95% of heroin used in China
comes from the Golden Triangle region, much of it funneled through
Myanmar.370 The border town of Ruili is known as “ground zero” for
China’s AIDS epidemic; AIDS is reportedly China’s leading cause of
death related to infectious disease.371 Gambling on the Myanmar side of
the border is associated with a wide range of illicit activities including
kidnapping, torture, and murder.372 Most Chinese have little interest in
Myanmar’s difficulties, simply regarding it as a failed state rich in natural
resources.373
Myanmar, despite its dependence, is also cautious about its
relationship with its neighbor. 374 It has become increasingly wary of
China’s foreign policy intentions. Some in the country fear that China
will use it as a bargaining chip with the United States.375 There are
indications that China has less sway over the Myanmar government than is
widely believed: “[t]he view that China could force political change in
Myanmar if only it were willing to use its influence is overstated. Beijing
can extract certain minor concessions, but they have never led to
fundamental changes.” 376 The mistrust goes both ways. Myanmar’s
366
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military rulers still distrust China for its previous support of the insurgent
Communist Party of Burma, and for its more recent dealings with ethnic
groups on the border.377 Myanmar government leaders also fear Chinese
domination of their country. Even Chinese officials have observed that
Myanmar, especially its northern regions, has become a Chinese economic
colony. 378 To reduce China’s influence, Myanmar has worked on
improving ties with other neighbors, particularly India.379
A test of the Myanmar-China relationship came in September
2007, when demonstrations led by Myanmar monks against an
unannounced price hike in fuel led to a violent crackdown by the military.
China urged restraint both privately and publicly. 380 It supported a
Security Council statement and—after softening it—a U.N. Human Rights
Council resolution deploring the violence. 381 Urging dialogue and
democratic progress, China was relieved that the instability brought about
by the demonstrations ended quickly.382
In January 2008, China joined in further criticism when it
supported a Security Council statement disapproving of the Myanmar
government’s progress on the release of political prisoners and on genuine
dialogue with the opposition following the 2007 crackdown. 383 In
response, less than a month later, the junta announced a timeline for
ratification of a new constitution and multiparty democratic elections.384
In 2008, the relationship was tested again after Cyclone Nargis hit
Myanmar. Facing intense international pressure, China convinced the
regime to accept, and publicly supported, the United Nation’s efforts to
supply international humanitarian aid. 385 During a December 2008
meeting between Myanmar’s leader at the time, Than Shwe, and Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, China urged the regime to do more for its
people, and said that China would not be able to continue supporting
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Myanmar’s bilateral relations with various countries, and noting that Russia, with a veto
vote on the Security Council, has recently become a key trading partner and weapons
supplier for Myanmar).
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Myanmar indefinitely.386 Yang also criticized Myanmar’s spending on
non-priority initiatives and the lengthy jail sentences of political
activists.387
In May 2009, China’s support for Myanmar was again at issue
when the regime extended Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest by eighteen
months for allegedly allowing an American, John Yettaw, to stay in her
house after he swam across a lake to visit her. China reportedly initially
supported a strong Security Council statement condemning the trial, but
backtracked after Russia opposed it.388 After sentencing, China expressed
opposition to a statement deploring the verdict, but agreed to a watereddown version expressing “serious concern.”389 Privately, Chinese officials
expressed support for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, and for dialogue with
the opposition, so long as stability and respect for the Myanmar
government’s political process were ensured.390
These developments in the China-Myanmar relationship echo
China’s reactions to Sudan’s problems. The International Crisis Group
characterizes China’s approach toward Myanmar’s political problems as
“value-free,” indicating a willingness to work with whatever government
is in power.391 In fact, China was the first to welcome the main opposition
party when it won the 1990 elections. 392 Playing all sides, China
maintains contact with opposition groups in exile, and, via the provincial
government of Yunnan, with ethnic groups along the China-Myanmar
border.393 These relations have strained the goodwill between the two
governments.394 There is even evidence that weapons used by armed
opposition groups may unofficially come from the People’s Liberation
Army and perhaps from Chinese state-owned companies. 395 Fighting
between these groups and the Myanmar military has led to waves of
refugees crossing the border into China, further exacerbating tensions
between the two countries.396
China’s political ties with Myanmar are undoubtedly strong.
Nevertheless, China’s continued support of Myanmar has had costs,
386
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particularly in degrading China’s global image and diplomatic leverage.397
Some speculate that China may conclude that international embarrassment
and criticism are not worth it: “[w]ithin China there are growing doubts
over whether it is worthwhile [to jeopardize] important bilateral relations
with Western countries—especially the U.S.—because of Myanmar.”398
Regarding a potential Security Council vote on a Commission of Inquiry
or ICC referral, it is critical to recall that China and Sudan also enjoyed
strong relations at the time of the Darfur crisis. Because of its geographic
proximity to China, however, Myanmar clearly has special strategic
importance to China that Sudan does not.
In January 2007 came what was probably the most significant
indication that China would treat Myanmar differently from Sudan. The
United States sponsored a resolution that would have called upon
Myanmar’s government to stop military attacks against civilians in ethnic
regions, release political prisoners, make tangible progress towards
democracy, end forced labor, and stop the use of rape by its military.399
China and Russia jointly vetoed the resolution.400 This was China’s first
Security Council veto since 1973 not related to Taiwan. China and Russia
stated that human rights problems were not within the mandate of the
Security Council unless they threatened regional or international peace
and security, which the situation in Myanmar did not.401 The vote showed
that despite China’s increasingly cooperative attitude towards Security
Council actions and international peacekeeping, it remains willing to
exercise its veto power to protect its allies and its notion of sovereignty.402
Yet the veto also had a cost. China’s image suffered, and it was heavily
397
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criticized in the international media.403 China hedged its position slightly
by having its ambassador to the United Nations and its State Councilor
both express impatience with Myanmar’s reforms. 404 Furthermore, a
resolution on human rights, political freedoms, and public safety is quite
different from one relating to criminal charges, for which China has never
used a veto.405
B. Political Developments in Myanmar in 2011 and 2012
In November 2010, for the first time in twenty years, Myanmar
held parliamentary elections. 406 Myanmar had not had a civilian
government since 1962.407 The elections were strongly criticized as being
unfair, by parties ranging from leading politicians inside Myanmar, to the
U.N. Secretary-General, to U.S. President Barack Obama.408 Few were
optimistic about change, particularly because a quarter of parliamentary
seats were reserved for military appointees.409 In March 2011, hardliner
and longtime military junta leader Senior General Than Shwe stepped
down from power, making way for the new President, ex-general and
former Prime Minister Thein Sein. Again, few had hopes for meaningful
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reform.410 Since then, however, political developments under the new
president—including the loosening of censorship, the release of some
political prisoners, a new law legalizing independent trade unions, the
suspension of work on a USD $3.6 billion dam being built by China, the
rewriting of tax and property ownership laws, an increase in civil servant
pay to prevent corruption, the convening of a national human rights
commission, and an agreement to end forced labor411 —have “stunned
observers inside and outside the country.”412
Outside leaders have urged caution in accepting these changes too
optimistically.413 It is still too soon to know the long-term effect of the
recent thaw. If sustained, however, a pattern of reforms, and a new spirit
410
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of international cooperation, could fundamentally change Myanmar’s
relationship with the West and with China. The immediate effect of these
developments is that any hope for a Commission of Inquiry or ICC
referral is unrealistic, because, even leaving China aside, Western powers
do not have the political will to seriously raise issues of justice and
criminal accountability while they are hoping for democratic change.414
But it is important to observe that if there is a lack of will to investigate
and prosecute crimes, it may be rooted in Western hopes for democracy
and liberalization, rather than based on either the absence of serious
crimes, or China’s refusal to cooperate.

X. CONCLUSION
Recent signs of democratic change in Myanmar have obscured
efforts to seek justice for victims of heinous crimes. Calls for
accountability—including a U.N. Commission of Inquiry—seem at this
point less realistic than they were even a year or two ago. It is premature,
however, to declare Myanmar a reformed nation. Armed conflict, and
reports of widespread sexual violence, have continued even since the new
government took power. Many believe that Senior General Than Shwe
continues to pull the strings of power.415
414
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Naturally, China has reacted positively to the apparent changes.
China would clearly not support a Commission of Inquiry to investigate
crimes in Myanmar. However, based on its foreign policy objectives, its
historical voting behavior on the Security Council, its experience with the
referral of Sudan to the ICC, and its economic and political relationships
with Sudan and Myanmar, it is not clear that China would veto such a
commission.
Over the past twenty years, China has gradually shifted from strict
defense of national sovereignty to reluctant acceptance of international
interventions. The value it places on international prestige, economic
growth, and political stability is at times detrimental to its allies. China’s
voting record on the Security Council reflects its disinclination to use its
veto power; instead, China abstains to appease rivals, foes, and allies.
Surprisingly, China abstained from resolutions requesting a Commission
of Inquiry to investigate Darfur, and referring the Darfur situation to the
ICC. These abstentions had negligible adverse impact on China’s
relationship with Sudan. Furthermore, the economic disparities between
China and its smaller allies indicate that it has the ability to vote as it
wishes without inordinate concern about the consequences.
The ICC is not the only option for Myanmar. In recent years,
nations recovering from internal wars and government-perpetrated
atrocities have created their own judicial mechanisms, sometimes with
U.N. collaboration, to provide a forum for victims and accountability for
perpetrators.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa,
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, are just three
examples of how justice, accountability, and reconciliation can be tailored
to reflect a country’s unique culture, history, and objectives. It is difficult
to predict what Myanmar will do, if anything, to account for past
injustices. Given the military’s dominance of the current government,416
any internal Myanmar action in the immediate future to prosecute current
or past military leaders is extremely unlikely. But justice takes time. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established
in 1993 to account for crimes committed from 1991 to 2001;417 South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in 1995 to
investigate crimes that occurred between March 1, 1960 and May 10,
1994;418 and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were
416
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established in 2003 to bring former government leaders to trial for crimes
committed between 1975 and 1979.419
Advocates for Burmese victims hoped to accelerate the judicial
process by directly requesting the U.N. Security Council to refer the
situation in Myanmar to the ICC. Ironically, however, the ultimate fate of
calls for a Commission of Inquiry or Article 13(b) referral is probably in
the hands of Myanmar’s leaders.420 If fundamental reforms are sustained,
such calls may wither away. But if reforms do not last, if government
oppression is renewed, or if there is a military coup d’état, no one should
be surprised if the United Nations decides to act, and no one should be
surprised if China declines to stand in its way.

419

Judge Resigns Citing Interference, RADIO FREE ASIA, Mar. 19, 2012,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/resignation-03192012165430.html.
420
The recent reforms in Myanmar, and turnover in its leadership, have likely reduced the
influence of those military leaders who would be most likely to be charged with war
crimes, making their protection by allies both inside and outside of the country less likely.
Cf. Max du Plessis & Christopher Gevers, UNSC Referral of Libya Gives ICC the
Opportunity to Prove Its Worth, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., Mar. 4, 2011,
http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1243 (arguing that African nations supported
the referral of Libya to the ICC because Libya’s leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, had
become “yesterday’s man”).

